Appellant Rodney E. Miller, Sr. ("Miller") appealed from three orders of the Superior Court: (1) an order granting the People's request for an ex parte temporary restraining order ("TRO") pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 606(h) of the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("CICO"), (2) an order adjudging Miller in civil contempt of court for violating the TRO, and (3) an order granting a preliminary injunction pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 606(f) of CICO. Miller's attorneys, Appellants Charles J. Grant, Esq. and William J. Glore, Esq., also appealed from the civil contempt order. With respect to the attorneys' appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction because, although the trial court's order threatened the attorneys with contempt, the court did not actually adjudge them in contempt of court. As to Miller's appeal from the TRO, the Court held that CICO's criminal forfeiture provisions are in personam in nature, thereby authorizing a Superior Court judge to issue pre-trial orders which directly order a defendant, over whom the court has personal jurisdiction, to do or refrain from doing something with respect to property located outside of the territory. Because the Supreme Court determined that the trial court had obtained personal jurisdiction over Miller, the Court affirmed the validity of the TRO. However, the Court reversed the order holding Miller in civil contempt because the TRO was ambiguous as to whether it restrained the particular bank account from which Miller had transferred funds to various individuals. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the preliminary injunction, holding that, although CICO prohibits pre-trial restraint of substitute assets, the injunction at issue did not improperly restrain Miller's substitute assets.