﻿<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Published Opinions News Summary</title>
    <description> </description>
    <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;amp;pageId=15125838</link>
    <atom:link href="https://www.vicourts.org:443/syndication/rss.aspx?serverid=12810860&amp;userid=5&amp;feed=datasummary&amp;key=WAhyY%2fhRUxNcAliPYpt5rimv%2buJdwJ%2bEVDFSY1JWCNFX9qXhlfOx8cobiL27CXRFfN8UDvDI7WqAelXmAWDJsfZtVtg%3d&amp;target_object_id=15125838&amp;portal_id=12810944&amp;v=2.0&amp;item_name=portlet_xml_title&amp;item_description=portlet_xml_summary&amp;item_pubdate=portlet_last_modified&amp;max_items=8" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" />
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    Considering an appeal from the Superior Court’s order granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the appellant from issuing assessments to the appellee’s members for past due common area charges and maintenance expenses associated with a commercial condominium unit at the Ritz-Carlton Club in St. Thomas for the years 2017, 2018, and 2019, the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion provided detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its extension of the underlying temporary restraining order (TRO) and its grant of the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, no violation of Rule 52(a)(2) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure occurred. Similarly, the content of that order satisfied the requirements of Rule 65(d) of those rules, and thus the preliminary injunction is not subject to being disturbed on that ground. Further, Rules 8 and 15 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure were not violated because the appellee was not required to include an application for injunctive relief in its initial pleadings, and the appellant’s suggestion that a party must include such a request in its pleadings is rejected. Finally, the appellee was not required to show actual success on the merits when applying for a preliminary injunction, and the Superior Court found in applying the factors from 3RC &amp;amp; Co., Inc., v. Boynes Trucking Sys., 63 V.I. 544 (2015), that the appellee showed a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s decision granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21336865</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21336865</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    Considering the Government of the Virgin Islands’ appeal from a Superior Court order confirming an arbitration award entered in the appellee Union’s favor, sustaining the Union’s grievances challenging the Bureau of Corrections’ overtime calculations, the Superior Court correctly determined that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the collective bargaining agreement. The Superior Court also correctly determined that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law in accepting the Union’s contention that construing the agreement’s overtime provision to allow “pyramiding,” i.e., paying both daily and weekly overtime for the same hours of work, was not contrary to both the Virgin Islands Fair Labor Standards Act and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The Superior Court’s order confirming the arbitration award is affirmed.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21319567</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21319567</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    In a breach of contract case, considering an order of the Superior Court denying the appellant’s motion for relief from the judgment’ under Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (b)(6), while certain letters regarding non-payment are newly discovered evidence for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2), as they contain facts in existence at the time of the judgment, the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to determine the reason for such non-payment, and its claims under Rule 60(b)(2) therefore fail. The appellant’s argument under Rule 60(b)(6) also fails because it reiterates the same arguments that it advanced under Rule 60(b)(2), and Rule 60(b)(6) provides only grounds for relief that are not already covered by Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Therefore, the Superior Court was correct in denying the appellant’s motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) and (6). The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21314804</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21314804</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    Considering an appeal from a 2023 order of the Superior Court granting a motion for relief from judgment brought under rules 59(e), 60(a), and 60(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure that reinstated the underlying action for dissolution of a limited liability company and associated damages over six years after it was dismissed in 2016, the Court adopts a narrow exception to the final judgment rule, holding that where (1) the Superior Court grants a motion that is specifically enumerated in and subject to rule 5(a)(4) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure, and (2) the adverse party appeals on the sole ground that the Superior Court had lost jurisdiction to grant such a motion because the 120-day “deemed denied” deadline in that rule had already expired, the Court will assume jurisdiction to determine whether the order granting the motion is indeed repugnant to rule 5(a)(4). Concluding that it has jurisdiction over the appeal in the instant case by virtue of this exception, the Court deems the 2023 order of the Superior Court to be repugnant to rule 5(a)(4), inasmuch as it was entered well after the 120-day period prescribed in that rule had expired, and the Superior Court had accordingly been divested of jurisdiction. As a result, the 2023 order is void. Appellees’ argument that rule 5(a)(4) did not apply to the 2023 order because it purportedly granted relief under rule 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake is rejected, because the relief it granted fell outside the proper scope of that rule. The Superior Court’s 2023 order is reversed and the 2016 dismissal is reinstated.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21313596</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21313596</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 18:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    Considering an appeal from the Superior Court’s September 10, 2024 judgment and sentence finding the defendant guilty of burglary in the third degree in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 444(1) and sentencing him to time served, the trial court neither abused its discretion in accepting the defendant’s plea tendered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) pursuant to Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor invalidated the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of such plea by conducting a thorough colloquy on the record. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment and sentence entered upon accepting the plea are affirmed.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21311711</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21311711</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    In an appeal from the March 1, 2023 judgment and sentence of the Superior Court in which the defendant was sentenced to 30 years in prison for second-degree murder consistent with the maximum sentence detailed in his plea agreement, the defendant’s challenge of his sentence on the theory that it was excessive, an abuse of discretion, and violated his due process rights by disregarding critical mitigating factors, including his youth, lack of prior felonies, difficult childhood, and potential for rehabilitation, is rejected. In sentencing the defendant, the Superior Court acted well within its lawful discretion, after conducting a thorough and deliberate evaluation of all pertinent facts and legal arguments. The record, including the plea and sentencing hearings, demonstrates that the sentencing was a reasoned and measured exercise of judicial authority, free from arbitrariness or caprice. The sentence conforms precisely to the plea agreement, and the Superior Court properly considered all mitigating factors. This appeal fails to present any substantial legal error or meritorious basis for reversal. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed as a reasoned exercise of discretion that faithfully applies the law to the pertinent facts.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21308512</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21308512</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    The People of the Virgin Islands, appeal from the Superior Court’s August 26, 2024 order granting the motion of the present appellee, Sharif Matthew, to suppress all cell phone evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant. Consistent with our recent holding in People v. Cumberbatch, 2026 VI 7, the Superior Court’s order is affirmed. Because the decision suppressed evidence in a criminal proceeding, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, under 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that search warrants must be supported by probable cause and must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In determining whether probable cause exists, a judge must make a practical common-sense decision that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. For a telephonic search warrant to be valid under our laws and rules, the testimony in support of the warrant must be recorded verbatim by an electronic recording device, by a court reporter, or in writing – but here there was no verbatim recording of the testimony by any means at all, and this purported practice clearly contravenes Rule 4-1. While an affidavit is not required to use specific language, the circumstances establishing probable cause must appear in the affidavit supporting the warrant, but here such information is absent from the affidavit. When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable clause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. Here, the telephonic warrant was lacking in both particularity and nexus, making any reliance upon it objectively unreasonable. Because the warrant was facially deficient and lacking in particularity, the officers could not have considered it to be valid. Thus, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to the seized cell phones. The “plain view” doctrine does not require the officers to have “near certainty” that the items found in plain view were contraband or evidence of a crime and officers only need probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity to seize evidence – but this standard is not met in this instance. Because the incriminating nature of the cell phones seized in this case was not apparent, they were not justifiably seized under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, any evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the cell phones must be suppressed. The Superior Court’s August 26, 2024 order granting Matthew’s motion to suppress all cell phone evidence and evidence acquired from the cell phones obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant is therefore affirmed.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21304006</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21304006</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title> </title>
      <description>
			    Regarding the plaintiff’s suit alleging that the defendants violated a purported 2009 joint venture agreement between it and the defendants to operate a fuel distribution business, the Superior Court’s denial of plaintiff’s August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration is vacated insofar as it pertains to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract. Those portions of the Superior Court’s August 19, 2024 judgment and accompanying findings of facts and conclusions of law that pertain to 3RC’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract are also vacated, as well as that portion of the Superior Court’s judgment awarding plaintiff damages in the amount of $494,098.47 for breach of contract, and the matter is remanded with instructions that the Superior Court first determine whether plaintiff established a breach of joint venture agreement before proceeding to any breach of contract analysis. In addition, the denial of plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration insofar as it pertains to plaintiff’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory, as well as that portion of the Superior Court’s August 19, 2024 judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes with prejudice, are likewise vacated, and the matter is remanded for the Superior Court to consider plaintiff’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory in the first instance, including whether it was raised for the first time in the August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration.			
			</description>
      <link>https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&amp;pageId=21297309</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9784218_21297309</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 13:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>