2010 Published Opinions News Summary

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:19:00 GMT

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's August 4, 2008 Order of Judgment and Commitment, holding that the trial court's admission of the out-of-court and in-court identifications of Appellant was not erroneous. In particular, the Court concluded that, although the pretrial identification procedure employed by the police was unnecessarily suggestive, the pretrial identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, the Court held that, because the admission of the pretrial identification was proper, the trial court did not err in admitting the in-court identification.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:18:00 GMT

Because the Superior Court's temporary custody order did not finally adjudicate the issue of neglect and was not a type of interlocutory order which could be immediately appealed, the appeal from that order was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:17:00 GMT

Appellant had shown no plausible basis for two witnesses to be returned to court to be examined on their out of court recantation statements. The two witnesses had identified Appellant as the assailant in written statements to the police on the day of the incident, but one witness subsequently recanted his initial identification of Appellant; both witnesses subsequently testified against Appellant in his trial and identified him as the assailant. Both witnesses knew Appellant prior to the shooting incident. After testifying both witnesses recanted their initial identifications of Appellant during a hiatus in the trial, even though they had both identified Appellant as the assailant in their trial testimonies. During the trial, the two letters of earlier recantations by one of the two witnesses were admitted in evidence. Therefore, the two witnesses' latest recantations are insufficient to compel the witnesses to reappear in court to be examined on their latest recantations. Appellant was therefore not entitled to compulsory process because a criminal defendant does not have a Constitutional right to have cumulative evidence admitted at trial.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:16:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure 10.2.1, which incorporates the provisions of title 4, section 284 of the Virgin Islands Code, governs judicial recusal of Supreme Court Justices. The Court further holds that neither Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 nor Superior Court Rule 139 bind the Supreme Court because no procedural mechanism exists to apply federal or Superior Court procedural rules to Supreme Court proceedings. However, the Court determines that, because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42's judicial disqualification procedure represents the minimum constitutional requirements necessary to safeguard a criminal contempt defendant's due process rights under the United States Constitution, it may nevertheless serve as a basis for judicial recusal in indirect criminal contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court. Finally, the Court finds that recusal is not required in this matter because the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's alleged disobedience of a court order, without more, does not compel that the judge who issued the order recuse himself from presiding over the defendant's indirect contempt proceeding.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:15:00 GMT

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's April 28, 2009 interlocutory order, which granted Appellee's motion to exclude the proposed testimony of the People's handwriting expert. Specifically, a majority of the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the two pieces of testimony, despite the fact that the trial court erroneously applied the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") rather than the statutorily-enacted Uniform Rules of Evidence ("URE"). Notably, the Court held that FRE 702's assist the trier of fact requirement, which is not embodied in 5 V.I.C. § 911(2)'s expert witness rule, is equivalent to 5 V.I.C. § 777(f)'s general relevancy requirement.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:14:00 GMT

Because Superior Court Rule 126 does not prohibit a court from participating in plea discussions, the court did not err by commenting on a proposed plea, and the defendant's attorneys did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the judge's comments.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:13:00 GMT

The Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to review a Superior Court order adjudicating a plaintiff's claim against a defendant, but not disposing of the defendant's counterclaim, because it is not a final appealable order. The Court further holds that while such an order may nevertheless be final if a) the order implicitly denies the counterclaim; b) judgment in favor of the plaintiff's claim renders the counterclaim moot; or c) the counterclaim was never properly before the Superior Court, none of those exceptions are present in the instant case. Significantly, the Court found that the defendant's counterclaim was properly before the Superior Court even though it was filed during the automatic stay mandated by 5 V.I.C. § 547 because documents filed during such a stay are voidable rather than void.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 21:12:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that, because dismissal for failure to prosecute constitutes an extreme sanction, the Superior Court may not order it unless it has expressly considered and weighed the extent of the plaintiff's personal responsibility, the prejudice-if any-to the other parties in the litigation, whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a history of dilatoriness, whether the plaintiff or attorney's conduct was willful or in bad faith, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, and the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claim.