2011 Published Opinions News Summary

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:12:00 GMT

The Court holds that, because Virgin Islands law requires that the government disprove beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense, the Superior Court committed plain error when it failed to expressly instruct the jury on the burden of proof. Moreover, the Court holds that, when a defendant charged with assault in the third degree concedes at trial that he possessed a machete, the Superior Court is not required to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault because the possibility that a jury would find that a machete is not a deadly weapon is too remote to require such an instruction.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:11:00 GMT

The Court, applying the traditional rules of statutory construction, holds that the Superior Court may consider juvenile delinquency adjudications that occurred prior to a minor's fourteenth birthday when determining whether to transfer the minor from the Family Division to the Criminal Division pursuant to sections 2508(b)(2) and (b)(3) of title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code. In addition, the Court holds that, because the offense of unlicensed possession of a firearm would be a felony if committed by an adult and the offense of assault in the third degree-for which the minor was previously adjudicated delinquent-is a "violent crime" as defined by section 2508(c), the Superior Court did not err when it found that the minor's transfer to the Criminal Division was mandatory pursuant to section 2508(b)(3).

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:10:00 GMT

In addressing the applicability of Superior Court Rule 15(a)'s thirty-day requirement for filing a petition for writ of review, the Court holds that a party is not an "aggrieved party" under Rule 15(a) during the effective period of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, which enjoins a judicial or quasi-judicial body from enforcing that body's decision against a party. The Court further holds that the time period during which the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is in effect will be excluded from the computation of time toward the thirty-day requirement, which limits the time for petitioning the court for a writ of review under Rule 15(a).

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:09:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that the insanity defense is available in both jury and bench trials. However, because the right to raise the insanity defense is personal to the defendant, the Superior Court may not sua sponte impose that defense unless it first finds that the evidence adduced in the proceedings raises a sufficient question as to the defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, and then conducts an inquiry into (1) whether the defendant is presently competent to stand trial; (2) if so, whether based on present mental capacity, the defendant could intelligently and voluntarily waive the insanity defense, and whether he actually has done so; and, if not, (3) whether the evidence of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged crime required imposition of the insanity defense. Additionally, the Supreme Court holds that the Superior Court may only take judicial notice of a fact if it represents general knowledge that cannot be reasonably questioned or disputed, and thus, while it can take judicial notice of the existence of a document, it cannot take judicial notice that the contents of that document are true. Thus, the Supreme Court concludes that the Superior Court committed plain error when it sua sponte imposed the insanity defense on a defendant after taking judicial notice of a psychiatrist's report. The Supreme Court, however, holds that, because the defendant was tried in a bench trial, the proper remedy for the Superior Court's error is not a new trial, but a new judgment based on the admissible evidence presented at the bench trial.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:08:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that, pursuant to its decision in Government v. Crooke, it possesses jurisdiction, under the collateral order doctrine, with respect to the portion of a Superior Court order holding that the Department of Labor violated the appellee's due process rights, but lacks jurisdiction over all other issues. With respect to the due process issue, the Supreme Court holds that the Superior Court did not err when it considered the issue for the first time in the appellee's petition for writ of review because section 306 of title 24 of the Virgin Islands Code provides that, in unemployment benefits context, exceptions to rulings of an administrative law judge not necessary to obtain judicial review. Finally, the Supreme Court affirms the Superior Court's holding that the DOL violated the appellee's due process rights because the administrative law judge deprived the appellee of a fair hearing by allowing her former employer to submit evidence on an ex parte basis after the hearing had already concluded.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:07:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that, pursuant to the plain language of section 3711(a) of title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code, the terms of a criminal defendant's probation cannot create a legally binding duty on the defendant's employer to continue to provide the defendant with employment. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the appellant's contempt claim against his employer. Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's holding that the appellant's complaint failed to state a claim, because the appellant failed to set out any factual allegations in the complaint which would permit the trial court to determine if the appellant stated a plausible right to relief.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:06:00 GMT

The Supreme Court holds that an employer can be liable for its negligence to the employees of independent contractors it hires, so long as the employer retains sufficient control over the independent contractor to create a legal duty to exercise that control with reasonable care. Because the testimony presented by the parties to the Superior Court conflicted on the extent of control the employer retained over the independent contractor in question, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the employer retained sufficient control to create a legal duty to the employee of the independent contractor and summary judgment was inappropriate. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment.

Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:05:00 GMT

The Court holds that based on the testimony of the parties at trial, there was sufficient evidence to support the Family Court's decision to award Cramer $6,000 to help liquidate the parties' credit card debts. Further, the Family Court's Order requiring Bradford to pay alimony to Cramer in the amount of $1,500 is not void for failing to specify the frequency of these payments because 16 V.I.C. § 347 dictates that "[p]ayments for support shall be made monthly." The Family Court's failure to follow the Child Support Guidelines in calculating Bradford's monthly child support obligation, however, requires that the child support award be vacated and the issue of child support be remanded to the Family Court for a determination under the Child Support Guidelines. Finally, the Court holds that the Family Court's Order requiring Bradford to provide Cramer and C.B. with rent free housing at No. 85 Miss Bea Road must also be vacated because the Family Court exceeded its jurisdictional authority.