2016 Published Opinions News Summary

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:14:00 GMT

Considering the plaintiff corporation's appeals from Superior Court orders dated June 24, 2013 and September 2, 2014, holding that its claims against the defendant were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the Superior Court erred in converting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment without first giving the corporation notice and a chance to respond. The Superior Court also erred in later granting summary judgment to the defendant on the remaining claims of the corporation's complaint because the defendant failed to meet his initial burden at summary judgment regarding the corporation's claim that it was unaware of the defendant's conduct until 2011 and that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled as a result via the discovery rule. The Superior Court's June 24, 2013 and September 2, 2014 orders are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:13:00 GMT

Considering an appeal filed by the Department of Human Services ("DHS") regarding the Superior Court's May 20, 2015 opinion denying its request to vacate an arbitrator's award dated February 25, 2007 directing that Marie Danielson, a DHS employee whose interests are represented by the United Industrial, Service, Transportation, Professional and Government Workers of North America-Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters (the "Union"), receive $101,775.96 in back pay, because section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. does not apply to this proceeding, and the Union has otherwise failed to meet its burden of establishing that the DHS's complaint is time-barred under any other statute of limitations, it is concluded that the matter was properly before the Superior Court. As to the merits, even if the highly deferential standard of review provided for by the FAA were applied rather than a de novo standard of review-an issue not reached in this case-the arbitrator in this case did not attempt to apply the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the parties, despite the limitations on his authority and the instructions expressly included in section 7 thereof, but instead imposed his own brand of "industrial justice" in express contravention of the agreement's terms. Accordingly, the May 20, 2015 opinion is reversed, and the Superior Court is directed on remand to vacate the arbitrator's February 25, 2007 decision.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:11:00 GMT

An order holding an attorney in criminal contempt for remarks made at a court hearing is reversed. Criminal contempt of court that obstructs the administration of justice is willful misconduct which embarrasses, hinders, or obstructs a court in its administration of justice or derogates the court's authority or dignity, thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute. Neither the purported acts of "arguing with the court in aggravated and elevated tones" nor "by personally criticizing a judge in open court" constitutes the obstruction of the administration of justice in this case. To the extent any disruption occurred, it is attributable not to this attorney, but to the Superior Court's reaction to her advocacy. In presenting the client's case to a court an attorney has the right to make a good-faith argument of which the judge does not approve. A Virgin Islands court may hold an individual in criminal contempt for disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command, as provided in 14 V.I.C. § 581(3), and it must be established-beyond a reasonable doubt-that a valid court order existed and that the contemnor knew of the order yet nevertheless willfully disobeyed it. Here the record does not support the Superior Court's conclusion that the attorney refused an order to leave the courtroom, and the Superior Court abused its discretion when it held her in criminal contempt for failure to obey such an order. While certain conduct may be punished summarily, here the court erred in concluding that it could preside over the matter simply because Superior Court Rule 138 does not mandate recusal. Pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 284(4) a judge must recuse himself or herself from a case if it is probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice, a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before the judge. Here the Superior Court erred when it held that Superior Court Rule 138 governed the matter and it should have afforded the attorney all of the protections of Rule 139, including having the contempt proceeding assigned to a different judge. Attorneys possess an obligation to advocate zealously for their clients, in good faith within the bounds of the law. On some occasions, this may entail making an argument that displeases a judge, or that a judge interprets-rightly or wrongly-as criticism. In this case, the Superior Court perceived as criticism what an attorney likely intended as advocacy, and imposed the severe sanction of criminal contempt. In doing so, it ignored the maxim that the law gives judges as persons, or courts as institutions, no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. The Superior Court's May 21, 2015 opinion and order adjudicating the attorney in criminal contempt are reversed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:10:00 GMT

In a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with one count of third-degree assault in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 297(2); one count of unlawfully discharging a firearm in violation of 23 V.I.C. § 479(a)(2); three counts of unauthorized use of a firearm in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a); and one count of first-degree reckless endangerment in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 625(a), and in which the jury ultimately acquitted the defendant of both third-degree assault and unlawful discharge of a firearm, but failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the unauthorized use of a firearm and reckless endangerment counts, the defendant appealed the Superior Court's order denying his motion to dismiss the unauthorized use of a firearm counts based on the jury's acquittal on the third-degree assault and unlawful discharge of a firearm counts. Although the defendant maintained at trial and in his appellate brief that the remaining firearm charges must be dismissed due to his acquittal on the third-degree assault and unlawful discharge charges, he expressly conceded at oral argument that he may be retried on all remaining charges, and limited his argument solely to challenging the potential imposition of a sentence enhancer premised on use of a firearm during a crime of violence if he is ultimately convicted at retrial. Since the defendant's waiver in this regard prevents the Court from granting him any relief that would prevent a retrial, an immediate appeal is not necessary to safeguard any of the rights conferred upon him by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:08:00 GMT

The Superior Court erred in summarily denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no defect in obtaining personal jurisdiction over the Government as respondent in the action since the petitioner need not serve the petition upon the Government. Under 5 V.I.C. § 1306 the Superior Court itself has the duty of serving the writ on the Government respondents once it is issued, and the Government must then file a return responding to the allegations. Granting the writ of habeas corpus constitutes an intermediate step in the statutory procedure - it does not address the underlying merits of the petition's allegations, nor does it entitle the petitioner to the ultimate relief sought in the petition. Issuing the writ and serving it on the Government respondents simply requires the filing of a return responding to the petition and production of the petitioner in court for a hearing on the merits of his allegations. A habeas petitioner may raise purely legal questions, which would include challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when not otherwise procedurally barred, since a conviction based on insufficient evidence presents an error of constitutional dimension that must be remedied. Arguments concerning the lack of authentication of a firearm and inadequate cross-examination could not be raised in the petition because both issues were previously raised on direct appeal and rejected by this Court - a habeas petition may not be used to re-litigate issues previously raised on direct appeal, and this case does not present any exceptional circumstances that would justify revisiting those issues. Petitioner's prima facie showing of fabricated evidence was not raised on direct appeal and is not procedurally barred. Likewise, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in the collateral proceeding rather than on direct appeal. The Superior Court erred by addressing the merits of these claims based only on the allegations of the petition, demanding too much of the petitioner, too soon. Because the petition made out a prima facie case for relief that was not procedurally barred, the Superior Court was required to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the person having custody over him, mandating the petitioner's production in court for an evidentiary hearing prior to addressing the merits of his claims, in accord with 5 V.I.C. § 1308 through § 1311. The Order of June 21, 2014 is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to issue the writ and conduct further proceedings as required by chapter 91 of title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:06:00 GMT

The Superior Court did not err in denying a petition for writ of mandamus in which the petitioner requested that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections be ordered to consider his application for parole. A petitioner must establish that his right to a writ of mandamus is clear and indisputable and that he has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief. Even if these two prerequisites are met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Here the petiole has failed to establish that his right to a writ of mandamus is clear and indisputable. There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Thus, the fact that a jurisdiction provides a mechanism for parole does not mean that a person automatically obtains a right to be released. Nothing in 5 V.I.C. § 4601 provides that any inmate possesses a right to parole, whether early or otherwise. On the contrary, the statute expressly provides that an inmate may not even be considered for parole without the recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, an act that requires exercise of discretion and judgment. The parole statute neither sets forth any factors that must guide the Director's exercise of his discretion, nor requires that the inmate be provided with an explanation of the reasons for not providing a favorable recommendation. Thus Virgin Islands statutory law provides only for discretionary parole, with no inmate eligible for parole until the Director of the Bureau of Corrections has first issued a favorable recommendation. Because such a recommendation is a discretionary, rather than a ministerial act, the petitioner cannot establish that his right to mandamus relief is clear and indisputable. Accordingly, the Superior Court's February 24, 2015 order dismissing this petition seeking a writ of mandamus is affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:04:00 GMT

Considering an appeal from a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor in a personal injury case alleging claims for negligence and premises liability, as well as the denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, because the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence of a breach of duty and causation, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Although the Superior Court erred by separately instructing the jury on negligence and premises liability, the error is both harmless and invited, given the defendant's representation to the Superior Court that the elements of negligence and premises liability are the same and its request that the Superior Court utilize a verdict form with only a single liability question. Further, while the Superior Court committed several errors with regard to plaintiff's expert testimony, these errors benefited the defendant, and thus cannot form the basis for a new trial. Declining to adopt the common-law doctrine of remittitur, the defendant's invitation to reduce the jury's damages award based on an independent weighing of the evidence on appeal is also refused. Accordingly, the Superior Court's May 12, 2015 judgment is affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:03:00 GMT

A writ of mandamus is granted, directing the nominal respondent in the Superior Court to consider and rule on the petitioner's pending application for writ of habeas corpus within 60 days, or take other meaningful action to further disposition of petitioner's case in that period. Petitioner, convicted of multiple counts of first- and second-degree aggravated rape and unlawful sexual contact, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in November, 2014. After motion filings, the Superior Court judge took no action for several months, and in June 2015 the present petition for writ of mandamus was filed, seeking an order requiring a decision on the habeas corpus application. The record reflects that the Nominal Respondent has not issued any orders in the underlying matter since granting permission for petitioner proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner has met the requirements for granting the writ of mandamus, establishing that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable and that he has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief. Based on independent review of the record without the benefit of a response from the nominal respondent, no legitimate excuse can be found for the nearly one and one-half year delay. Accordingly, since the public interest and other considerations strongly support mandamus relief, a writ of mandamus shall issue directing the nominal respondent to rule on this petitioner's habeas corpus petition within 60 days of the date of this Opinion, or take other meaningful action to further the disposition of that case in that period, such as issuing a ruling on the respondent's motion to dismiss.