2018 Published Opinions News Summary

Fri, 23 Jun 2023 12:46:00 GMT

Upon a motion filed by counsel for an appellant who died during the pendency of an appeal, advising this Court that the Superior Court refused to consider the petition for appointment of a personal representative on the merits due to a standing order of the Presiding Judge directing that such petitions not be docketed outside of probate matters, as well as a direct appeal of that order, it is held that the Presiding Judge lacks the authority to unilaterally establish court procedures that conflict with the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure or the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure, or that effectively require other judges to comply with the Presiding Judge’s interpretation of Virgin Islands statutory law. The June 20, 2018 standing order issued by the Presiding Judge is not a valid exercise of the Superior Court’s rule-making authority, for approval for the practice was never obtained—or even sought—from this Court. The order also is not a valid exercise of the Presiding Judge’s power to oversee the work of the other Superior Court judges, since it does not address an administrative issue, but seeks to bind other judges on a legal question. The June 20, 2018 standing order is declared to be invalid, the July 13, 2018 order denying appointment of a personal representative in the present proceedings is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for the limited purpose of ruling on the merits of the petition for appointment of a personal representative within 90 days. The appeal in S. Ct. Civ. No. 2018-0020 shall be held in abeyance pending determination of the petition.

Fri, 10 Sep 2021 13:02:00 GMT

In a habeas corpus petition, assuming without deciding that claims of error in jury instructions that are not properly preserved at trial and not pursued during a direct appeal can nevertheless properly be considered for the first time in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, here it is concluded that the jury instructions given were proper and that any error in those instructions was harmless. The Superior Court’s September 11, 2018, order denying the defendant’s petition is affirmed.

Thu, 29 Apr 2021 20:49:00 GMT

In an appeal from appointment of a guardian the Superior Court decided the merits without ever appointing the statutorily required visitor to assist it in its determination, under the Virgin Islands Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, 15 V.I.C. § 5-305(a). The Superior Court failed to comply with the requirement in 5 V.I.C. § 5-310(a)(2) to consider persons nominated by the guardian, only if at the time of the nomination the respondent had sufficient capacity to express a preference. The statute requires that the court consider whether at the time of the nomination the respondent had sufficient capacity to express a preference. On remand, the Superior Court must determine whether or not the proposed ward had the capacity to express a preference—both when he granted his daughter a power of attorney, and when his lawyer filed a motion during the trial stating that he preferred his current wife as his guardian. The Superior Court’s December 5, 2018 judgment is vacated and this case is remanded for fulfillment of the statutory requirements, including the appointment of a visitor.

Thu, 22 Apr 2021 16:33:00 GMT

The defendant’s conviction for mayhem under 14 V.I.C. § 1341(a)(1) is affirmed. Because there was both documentary and testimonial evidence from multiple witnesses that the victim’s ear was missing a significant portion of the helix, which would not regenerate with time, and that such a disfigurement was objectionable to the average person, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim was permanently and seriously disfigured, thus establishing the fourth element of the crime of mayhem. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding sufficient evidence of permanent, serious disfigurement and denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The judgment is affirmed.

Thu, 03 Sep 2020 22:28:00 GMT

A petition for a writ of mandamus has demonstrated that the petitioner lacks adequate means of attaining the desired relief other than a writ of mandamus, and that he possesses a clear and indisputable right to have a grievance that was filed in the year 2018 either dismissed or referred to the Preliminary Review Committee. Rule 207.9 requires that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel either dismiss a grievance or transmit it to the Preliminary Review Committee for a hearing in a timely fashion; it does not have the option to simply hold a grievance indefinitely. Because it is alleged that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel has failed to take meaningful action to substantively resolve the underlying grievance, an appeal to this Court is not an adequate alternate remedy. Since issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances, the petition for writ of mandamus is granted and it is directed that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel within 14 days either dismiss the grievance or refer it to the Preliminary Review Committee.

Tue, 12 Feb 2019 18:58:00 GMT

Because the Bureau of Corrections failed to assert that appeal of a 2015 Superior Court opinion and order is untimely, any defect as to timeliness has been waived, and this Court may reach the merits. However, because no copy of the appellant’s initial filing is included on this appeal, and the only relevant document included in the Joint Appendix supports the Superior Court’s decision to treat this action as a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Superior Court committed no error when it failed to sua sponte treat this action as a suit for debt or breach of contract. While the Superior Court misinterpreted Rule 5(a)(4) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure when it held that it lacked the authority to rule on a motion for relief from judgment even though it had been filed outside of the 28-day period prescribed by Appellate Rule 5(a)(4), the error is ultimately harmless since the motion would nevertheless have been denied on the merits. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s March 11, 2015 opinion and order denying the appellant’s mandamus petition, as well as its August 2, 2017 order denying his motion for relief from judgment, are affirmed.

Tue, 12 Feb 2019 16:53:00 GMT

Tue, 12 Feb 2019 16:50:00 GMT

An infant’s guardian ad litem filed a petition for a supervisory writ of mandamus, as well as a subsequent appeal, arguing that the Superior Court compromised her role as a guardian. Although this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal – because the issues raised are not shown to be inextricably intertwined with the granting or dissolving of an injunction – it has jurisdiction over the petition for writ of mandamus in accord with 4 V.I.C. § 32(b). While this case is not appropriate for a supervisory writ of mandamus, the guardian has met the three-factor test applicable to traditional petitions for writ of mandamus, by demonstrating a clear and indisputable right to relief, and there are no other avenues for obtaining timely relief exist; a foster placement could negatively affect the infant by the time the case becomes appealable. A writ of mandamus is appropriate here. The Superior Court ignored an unambiguous statute that grants the guardian ad litem access to the home study and the prospective foster parent’s file, although the records sought are clearly reports relevant to the case under 5 V.I.C. § 2542. Additionally, it is imperative to correct the Superior Court’s overly restrictive understanding of a guardian ad litem’s role in child and neglect proceedings, so that the best interests of this infant and similarly situated children are not negatively affected by the Superior Court’s misinterpretation. The petition is granted in part, the Superior Court’s order is vacated, and a writ is issued compelling the Superior Court to allow the guardian ad litem access to pre-placement home study records and information in the prospective foster parent’s file. A writ of mandamus is denied with respect to a subpoena duces tecum, since the guardian failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she lacks other methods of obtaining the same relief .