https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=17359737 In the appellant’s challenge to the dismissal with prejudice of her interlocutory appeal by the Superior Court Appellate Division from an order of the Superior Court Magistrate Division disqualifying Attorney Mark L. Milligan from representing her in a probate case, the dismissal is reversed and this case is remanded with instructions to direct the Magistrate Division to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Milligan’s disqualification. One exception to the final judgment rule, not codified in 4 V.I.C. § 33(b)-(c), is the collateral order doctrine, a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule that applies to a small class of prejudgment orders which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, and are too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. A proponent must demonstrate that the challenged ruling (1) conclusively determined the disputed question; (2) resolved an important issue separate from the merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Here, the order appealed to the Appellate Division was not final and, although Sergent only implicitly alleged the collateral order doctrine as a basis by which the Appellate Division could address her appeal, her assertion is persuasive and this Court will remand this matter to the Superior Court with instructions as outlined in this opinion. There are several reasons for treating certain orders as final in the probate context even when equivalent orders entered in ordinary civil cases would not qualify as final orders. Here, an internal appeal case is authorized by Superior Court Rule 322(a), and rather than dismiss the appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, the Superior Court should have recognized that an exception to the final judgment rule existed which allowed it to hear the matter and decide the appeal on the merits. In the proceedings below, to decide Milligan’s disqualification pursuant to Rule 211.3.7 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Professional Conduct, the Magistrate Division merely reviewed billing submissions and deduced that they indicated Milligan had personal information germane to the litigation: the Magistrate Division failed to question Milligan concerning the accuracy of the submissions, failed to ask Sergent about Garcia’s awareness and understanding of the will Milligan prepared, and failed to interview the witnesses who allegedly signed the document at Garcia’s behest and who saw Garcia volitionally sign the document. With such sparse information, we cannot conclude that the Magistrate had a sufficient record from which to properly address Milligan’s disqualification. Accordingly, the Magistrate Division erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his disqualification. Therefore, this case is remanded with instructions to the Superior Court to direct the Magistrate Division to conduct an evidentiary hearing to properly ascertain if Milligan should be disqualified from representing appellant and the estate of Felipe Garcia. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20741845 12810860_20741845 Tue, 11 Mar 2025 20:09:00 GMT In an appeal from the Superior Court’s August 16, 2021 opinion and order, which granted a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining trespass upon plaintiff’s property, the judgment is affirmed. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, never awarded as of right, but only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief, and the Superior Court must consider four factors: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. In a trespass action, the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands requires that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant intentionally (a) entered land in the possession of the other, or caused a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remained on the land, or (c) failed to remove from the land a thing which he was under a duty to remove. Applying these elements of trespass, the Superior Court committed no error: the evidence clearly supports the Superior Court’s finding that the plaintiff has a reasonable probability of success on the merits, that she would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, that the defendant would not be irreparably harmed by the injunction, and that the injunction is in the public interest. It is therefore concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, and its order granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19987139 12810860_19987139 Wed, 20 Dec 2023 15:36:00 GMT The Superior Court’s June 17, 2021, order denying the defendant’s motion for modification of bail is reversed. Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 guarantees that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties in the case of criminal offenses, except for first degree murder or any capital offense when the proof is evident or the presumption great.” 48 U.S.C. § 1561. Here, since the People did not charge the defendant with first degree murder or a capital offense, the Superior Court possessed an obligation to grant him bail and must impose release conditions—including the amount of bail—that represent the least restrictive means of assuring the defendant’s appearance and submission to the judgment of the court. While the Superior Court is not precluded from imposing bail that a defendant cannot afford to post, a defendant’s indigence—or great wealth—is certainly a relevant consideration in determining the amount of bail and other release conditions. These same considerations apply with equal force to a motion to modify or reduce bail. In this case, the Superior Court did not explain how its weighing of those factors warranted setting bail in the amount of $1,000,000 but appeared to presume the correctness of the release conditions set by the magistrate judge at an advice of rights hearing—including bail of $1,000,000—in effect treating the motion for modification of bail as if it were a motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s bail determination. Therefore, the June 17, 2021, order denying this defendant’s motion for modification of bail is reversed, and the case is remanded for the Superior Court to apply the correct legal standard https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18457358 12810860_18457358 Fri, 01 Apr 2022 21:14:00 GMT Dismissal of an application for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to a Coastal Zone Management (“CZM”) permit is affirmed. The Revised Organic Act sets forth a procedure for how a bill becomes a law, and that procedure was followed with respect to Act No. 8407, leading the Superior Court to dismiss this action as moot. Because one legislature cannot bind a subsequent legislature by enacting unrepealable or unmodifiable super-legislation, it is irrelevant whether the procedure set forth for modification of permits in the CZM Act was followed, since the 33rd Legislature was entitled to pass, and Governor Bryan entitled to sign into law, new legislation, whether generally or limited to a specific permit.  Accordingly, the Superior Court’s May 12, 2021 dismissal order is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18451590 12810860_18451590 Wed, 30 Mar 2022 19:58:00 GMT In a divorce proceeding, the non-resident wife’s personal jurisdiction defense is rejected. The Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute authorizes the Superior Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person based on “a claim for relief arising from the person’s (1) transacting any business in this territory,” 5 V.I.C. § 4903(a), and this does not require participation in business or commercial activities but only that a defendant engage in some type of purposeful activity within the territory. Because the wife’s actions were purposeful and directed to the Virgin Islands, and sufficiently related to the claims to be litigated as part of the husband’s divorce action, the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Virgin Islands Long Arm Statute comports with due process, and the Superior Court erred in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the wife. It was also error to dismiss the husband’s petition on forum non conveniens grounds, since 5 V.I.C. § 4905 mandated that the Superior Court accept jurisdiction over the husband’s divorce petition unless “substantial justice” required otherwise. The Superior Court actively contributed to the denial of substantial justice by unnecessarily prolonging the underlying divorce proceedings by declining to hear a case within its jurisdiction and instead referring it to another state which had already declined to exercise jurisdiction under its own laws. Finally, the Superior Court committed error when it denied the husband’s motion for partial summary judgment. The husband submitted overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence with his partial summary judgment motion, and the wife never contended in her opposition that he had failed to establish his entitlement to a divorce. Her answer admitted that there has been an irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. Thus the Superior Court erred when it denied the husband’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of divorce. Accordingly, the April 16, 2019 opinion and order granting the wife’s motion to dismiss and the July 24, 2018 order denying the husband’s motion for partial summary judgment are reversed. It is further ordered that, upon remand, the Superior Court shall immediately enter a decree of divorce and exercise jurisdiction over all outstanding issues that remain between the parties. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18246837 12810860_18246837 Tue, 04 Jan 2022 13:45:00 GMT On an application by the Virgin Islands Bar Association requesting amendment of Supreme Court Rule 211.5.5, pertaining to multijurisdictional practice and the unauthorized practice of law, to include new language which would track Rule 5.5(c) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the petition is denied. Previously, this Court modified Rule 211.5.5(b) by adding an express cross-reference § 443 to ensure that adoption of the Rule did not erase or modify pre-existing case law pertaining to the unauthorized practice of law. Then this Court adopted Rule 202.1 to establish a formal process for the admission and registration of in-house counsel. And in direct response to a request from the Virgin Islands Bar Association, this Court amended Rule 201, pertaining to pro hac vice admission, to greatly liberalize the rule by repealing the lifetime limit of three pro hac vice appearances by a lawyer or law firm and to also repeal the requirement that a pro hac vice attorney pay a licensing fee. The present opinion addresses any misunderstanding of what does and does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law in the Virgin Islands and the rest of the United States. Cognizant of the importance of this issue to the Bar Association, its request is referred to the Advisory Committee on Rules, which may, in its discretion and pursuant to its ordinary procedures, further study the matter, solicit and receive comments from the Bar Association and other stakeholders, and if appropriate suggest amendments or other changes to Rule 211.5.5 for consideration by this Court. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18234396 12810860_18234396 Tue, 28 Dec 2021 19:44:00 GMT In a suit for personal injuries allegedly sustained by a passenger while deplaning from the defendant’s aircraft when the stairway collapsed to the ground, heard as a bench trial upon consent of the parties, no clear error is found in the judgment of the Superior Court entered in the plaintiff’s favor. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant was negligent as a common carrier and awarding damages to the plaintiff for past and present medical expenses, pain and suffering, as well as future pain and suffering. The Superior Court’s March 10, 2020 judgment is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18228289 12810860_18228289 Thu, 23 Dec 2021 19:04:00 GMT Following remand to the Superior Court for explanation of its reasoning in fixing awards of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 541 to certain defendants after dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit for exclusive title to a property on the island of St. John, it is concluded that the Superior Court abused its discretion in substantially reducing its award of attorneys’ fees to each defendant. Application of the factors set forth in Supreme Court Rule 211.1.5(a) was erroneous, and the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in applying a substantially similar federal discretionary fee award statute are considered. However, because the Superior Court’s errors benefited the plaintiff, and because these defendants did not file a cross-appeal challenging the reduced awards, the Superior Court’s April 4, 2014, opinions and orders awarding attorney’s fees are affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18225207 12810860_18225207 Wed, 22 Dec 2021 20:20:00 GMT