https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=15125848 In an appeal from an order denying injunctive relief and dismissing a claim for trespass, the judgment is affirmed. The appellants never filed an appeal with the Board of Land Use Appeals, and specifically invoked the jurisdiction of the Superior Court under Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), which authorizes consolidation of the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. Appellants acquiesced in a bench trial on the merits, and failed to promptly seek an administrative remedy; and the Superior Court never prevented them from filing an appeal to the Board. The Superior Court merely adjudicated the case before it, and did not err. The argument that appellants’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury was violated by consolidating the preliminary and permanent injunction hearings is not reached on this appeal, because they waived that right by not asserting a demand for a jury trial in the Superior Court. Based on all of the evidence before it, the Superior Court did not err in finding that the appellants did not prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and – although it did not have to definitively find the existence of an implied easement to determine whether they met their burden of proof – the fact that the Superior Court found an implied easement demonstrates that it did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s requested injunctive relief, and that it did not err in dismissing the claim for trespass. This Court has previously considered § 2.13 of the Third Restatement of Property and has expressly adopted it as the best rule for the Virgin Islands after a full Banks analysis, thus the decision of the Superior Court is affirmed as to that issue. The Superior Court did not violate the Statute of Frauds, and correctly found an implied easement existed based on the reference to the right of way on the map. For these reasons, the decision of the Superior Court in its August 16, 2019 amended memorandum opinion and order is affirmed https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20727014 12810860_20727014 Thu, 10 Apr 2025 12:37:00 GMT On a petition for writ of for habeas corpus which the Virgin Islands Superior Court dismissed in part and granted in part, the Superior Court's memorandum opinion denying relief for insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for third degree assault is affirmed. The petitioner failed to meet the heavy burden in advancing an insufficiency of the evidence claim. However, the Order staying Count VI of his conviction for simple assault is reversed; the Superior Court is directed, on remand, to dismiss count VI in accordance with the standard in Titre v. People, 2019 VI 3. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19209977 12810860_19209977 Tue, 03 Jan 2023 18:15:00 GMT In consolidated actions brought by Jevon Gerald, as lawful successor of the Estate of Lucien Evans England, Sr. (“Gerald”) and Christian Brown, as the Executor of the Estate of Patrice Hale Brown (“Brown”), the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a defense motion for a new trial on the basis of improper closing argument by Brown’s attorney. The award of $50 million to Patrice Brown’s estate and $20 million to Christian Brown for a total of $70 million non-economic compensatory damages is grossly excessive and against the weight of the evidence, thus this case is remanded a new trial on the sole issue of noneconomic compensatory damages. The jury’s finding on liability and Brown’s punitive damages award of $12.3 million are affirmed. Under Rule 803(5) evidence allowed under the Recorded Recollection exception may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party, hence it was a violation of the rule to allow the jury to receive the actual physical diary pages when offered by Brown, and if the evidence on remand presents a similar context, the diary pages themselves will be inadmissible after being read into the record. Reynolds’ conduct in this case was extremely reprehensible. In Gerald, the jury awarded $30 million in punitive damages and the recoverable amount of compensatory damages was only $1 million. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the appropriate measure of the harm plus the actual damages for use in the ratio to punitive damages calculation is $1.6 million, which results in a ratio of 18.75:1 ($30 million punitive award to $1.6 million harm); a ratio that exceeds single digits and in this case is constitutionally excessive; that award is reduced to the constitutionally acceptable sum of $14.4 million. The $1 million in recoverable compensatory damages award in Gerald is reasonable and neither party has complained that it is excessive or inadequate. Because § 1451 only applies to actions based on “negligence,” it cannot be read as applying to intentional conduct—as was found in Brown and Gerald—rendering comparative fault inapplicable. The legislature only overruled the traditional common law rule that contributory negligence barred a plaintiff’s recovery and did not overrule the traditional common law rule that contributory negligence does not bar or result in apportionment of damages in an intentional tort claim. In Gerald where the jury returned verdicts on both negligence and intentional tort claims, it is not possible to sever the negligence claim—which can be apportioned for comparative fault—from the intentional tort claims which cannot. Because the claims and corresponding damage awards in Gerald and Brown are unitary, and comparative fault cannot be assigned to intentional torts, the entire award cannot be apportioned. The applicable statutes do not support an award of prejudgment interest in these cases and the Superior Court erred in awarding prejudgment interest as a component of both judgments. Having concluded that the jury awarded grossly excessive compensatory damages in Brown and constitutionally excessive punitive damages in Gerald, the $12.3 million punitive damages award in Brown is affirmed and the $50 million compensatory award to Brown’s estate and $20 million to Christian Brown in Brown are vacated. The case is remanded for a new trial on compensatory damages only in Brown. The $1 million compensatory award in Gerald is affirmed but the punitive damages awarded are reduced from $30 million to $14.4 million and entry of a total judgment of $15.4 million in Gerald is directed. The awards of prejudgment interest are vacated in Brown and Gerald and the denial of apportionment for comparative fault in both cases is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18724404 12810860_18724404 Thu, 07 Jul 2022 20:21:00 GMT In a review of an arbitration proceeding between a union and the Virgin Islands Port Authority, arising from an employee’s request for donated leave to facilitate care of his mother during a serious illness, under the applicable Virgin Islands common law principles the Superior Court failed to sufficiently defer to the arbitrator, in that it fully upheld the arbitrator’s primary rationale for awarding full back pay and benefits to employee – under timeliness requirements and a forfeiture provision in the collective bargaining agreement – but nevertheless vacated the arbitration award solely because it disagreed with the arbitrator’s alternate ground for awarding the same remedy. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s October 2, 2019 opinion and order are reversed and this action is remanded with instructions to reinstate the May 5, 2017 award of the arbitrator. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18642951 12810860_18642951 Thu, 16 Jun 2022 20:39:00 GMT The Superior Court’s March 25, 2019 opinion and order, which awarded custody of the appellant mother’s minor child to his father is affirmed. While a timely notice of this appeal was not filed, and a motion for reconsideration treated as a motion for relief from the judgment arising under Rule 59(e) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure only tolls the time for filing an appeal until 30 days after that motion is denied, the timelines for filing a notice of appeal are case-processing rules and may, therefore, be waived by an opposing party’s failure to object. Here, considering this appeal on the merits would further, rather than undermine, the administration of justice and lead to more efficient use of judicial resources. On the merits, applying the best interests of the child standard, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the father possessed a greater ability and willingness to nurture the child, and committed no error when it failed to credit the mother as the child’s primary caregiver, and consequently did not abuse its discretion when it awarded custody to the father. Alleged error in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child was waived due to failure to move for appointment of a guardian ad litem at any time prior to the mother’s post-judgment motion, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint a guardian ad litem sua sponte. Appellant also did not request an in camera interview before or during the hearing below, but did so for the first time during closing arguments; because this issue was never fairly presented to the Superior Court, it has been waived for purposes of appeal. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18147350 12810860_18147350 Thu, 18 Nov 2021 13:45:00 GMT Regarding a challenge to the Superior Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the information and criminal charges filed against him, in which he asserted violations of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the Court holds that the defendant waived appellate review of the denial of such motion because he entered an unconditional guilty plea, rather than a conditional plea, thereby precluding appellate review of constitutional pretrial issues that materialized before he entered the plea. The defendant’s unconditional plea agreement specifically states that he may only dispute his sentence on appeal, and even though his notice of appeal cites his sentence as the basis for the appeal, his appellate brief completely fails to discuss his sentence, focusing instead on the waived issue of the purported Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violations. The Court further concludes that even if the merits of defendant’s appeal were to have been reached, the Superior Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on purported Sixth Amendment speedy trial violations would have been affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18050749 12810860_18050749 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 18:38:00 GMT In an appeal from a Superior Court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s misrepresentation and intentional interference with business relations claims that she brought against the defendant bank, which allegedly arose out of an increase to an approved credit limit for the plaintiff’s business credit card, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the bank misrepresented any aspect of the credit limit increase process, including but not limited to the imposition of a UCC-1 lien on all of the assets of the business, and plaintiff is deemed to have waived the issue of whether the bank intentionally interfered with her existing vendor contracts in connection with that process. The Superior Court’s judgment is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18012046 12810860_18012046 Thu, 16 Sep 2021 19:53:00 GMT Because the Legislature enacted 5 V.I.C. § 541 with the purpose of abrogating the “American Rule” against routine recovery of attorney’s fees, this Court liberally and broadly construes the phrase “prevailing party” in that statute, in light of the Legislature’s intent to indemnify the party that is not at fault in the litigation. Since, in this case, the ex-wife prevailed on every disputed issue and obtained a monetary award far greater than monies she consented to pay the ex-husband, the Superior Court committed no error when it determined that she was the prevailing party and granted her motion for an award of $3,098.70 in attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s July 17, 2019 order is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=17778616 12810860_17778616 Tue, 15 Jun 2021 14:44:00 GMT