Published Opinions News Summary

Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:33:00 GMT

Considering an appeal from the Superior Court’s September 10, 2024 judgment and sentence finding the defendant guilty of burglary in the third degree in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 444(1) and sentencing him to time served, the trial court neither abused its discretion in accepting the defendant’s plea tendered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) pursuant to Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor invalidated the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of such plea by conducting a thorough colloquy on the record. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment and sentence entered upon accepting the plea are affirmed.

Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:32:00 GMT

In an appeal from the March 1, 2023 judgment and sentence of the Superior Court in which the defendant was sentenced to 30 years in prison for second-degree murder consistent with the maximum sentence detailed in his plea agreement, the defendant’s challenge of his sentence on the theory that it was excessive, an abuse of discretion, and violated his due process rights by disregarding critical mitigating factors, including his youth, lack of prior felonies, difficult childhood, and potential for rehabilitation, is rejected. In sentencing the defendant, the Superior Court acted well within its lawful discretion, after conducting a thorough and deliberate evaluation of all pertinent facts and legal arguments. The record, including the plea and sentencing hearings, demonstrates that the sentencing was a reasoned and measured exercise of judicial authority, free from arbitrariness or caprice. The sentence conforms precisely to the plea agreement, and the Superior Court properly considered all mitigating factors. This appeal fails to present any substantial legal error or meritorious basis for reversal. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed as a reasoned exercise of discretion that faithfully applies the law to the pertinent facts.

Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:38:00 GMT

The People of the Virgin Islands, appeal from the Superior Court’s August 26, 2024 order granting the motion of the present appellee, Sharif Matthew, to suppress all cell phone evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant. Consistent with our recent holding in People v. Cumberbatch, 2026 VI 7, the Superior Court’s order is affirmed. Because the decision suppressed evidence in a criminal proceeding, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, under 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that search warrants must be supported by probable cause and must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In determining whether probable cause exists, a judge must make a practical common-sense decision that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. For a telephonic search warrant to be valid under our laws and rules, the testimony in support of the warrant must be recorded verbatim by an electronic recording device, by a court reporter, or in writing – but here there was no verbatim recording of the testimony by any means at all, and this purported practice clearly contravenes Rule 4-1. While an affidavit is not required to use specific language, the circumstances establishing probable cause must appear in the affidavit supporting the warrant, but here such information is absent from the affidavit. When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable clause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. Here, the telephonic warrant was lacking in both particularity and nexus, making any reliance upon it objectively unreasonable. Because the warrant was facially deficient and lacking in particularity, the officers could not have considered it to be valid. Thus, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to the seized cell phones. The “plain view” doctrine does not require the officers to have “near certainty” that the items found in plain view were contraband or evidence of a crime and officers only need probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity to seize evidence – but this standard is not met in this instance. Because the incriminating nature of the cell phones seized in this case was not apparent, they were not justifiably seized under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, any evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the cell phones must be suppressed. The Superior Court’s August 26, 2024 order granting Matthew’s motion to suppress all cell phone evidence and evidence acquired from the cell phones obtained pursuant to a telephonic search warrant is therefore affirmed.

Tue, 26 May 2026 13:45:00 GMT

Regarding the plaintiff’s suit alleging that the defendants violated a purported 2009 joint venture agreement between it and the defendants to operate a fuel distribution business, the Superior Court’s denial of plaintiff’s August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration is vacated insofar as it pertains to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract. Those portions of the Superior Court’s August 19, 2024 judgment and accompanying findings of facts and conclusions of law that pertain to 3RC’s claims for breach of joint venture agreement and breach of contract are also vacated, as well as that portion of the Superior Court’s judgment awarding plaintiff damages in the amount of $494,098.47 for breach of contract, and the matter is remanded with instructions that the Superior Court first determine whether plaintiff established a breach of joint venture agreement before proceeding to any breach of contract analysis. In addition, the denial of plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration insofar as it pertains to plaintiff’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory, as well as that portion of the Superior Court’s August 19, 2024 judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims against James Boynes and Joanna Boynes with prejudice, are likewise vacated, and the matter is remanded for the Superior Court to consider plaintiff’s alter ego/corporate veil piercing theory in the first instance, including whether it was raised for the first time in the August 30, 2024 post-judgment motion for reconsideration.

Thu, 21 May 2026 18:19:00 GMT

Considering the People’s appeal from a Superior Court order granting the defendant-appellee’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone, because there was no probable cause established for the search and no nexus that connected the cell phone to the defendant’s alleged crimes, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the cell phone or the information it contained as evidence. The Superior Court’s order suppressing evidence obtained from the search is affirmed.

Wed, 13 May 2026 20:21:00 GMT

The Superior Court’s order denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is affirmed. Appellant was arrested in 2018 for allegedly engaging in sexual intercourse with his minor stepdaughter when she was between 12 and 18 years old. On October 17, 2022, the People re-filed the criminal charges against this defendant in a ten count information and commenced a new criminal case. On August 11, 2023, the People presented the defendant with a conditional plea offer on a charge of unlawful sexual contact, count eight of the information, and the People would recommend a prison sentence of 15 years, in addition to other conditions. Defendant endorsed the conditional plea agreement, which preserved appellate review of the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. Three days later defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which Superior Court denied in the June 17, 2023 order now on appeal, in which it concluded that the delay between defendant’s arrest in October 2022 and the trial date scheduled for September 2023 was not presumptively prejudicial. Applying all the factors established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Superior Court concluded that although this defendant asserted his rights to a speedy trial in a motion before the court, none of the other Barker factors were met; therefore, there was ultimately no prejudice to the defendant. This appeal followed. It is here held that, for purposes of the first Barker factor, the Speedy Trial period begins to run with the first arrest or information, whichever is earlier. The period is then tolled when the prosecution dismisses the charges nolle prosequi, and the period resumes running with the second arrest or information on charges that are the same or otherwise vary only in the addition of lesser included charges stemming from the same criminal incident. Here it is agreed that the length of delay in both cases lodged against this defendant, totaling four years, should be combined. Accordingly the length of delay here is presumptively prejudicial, and the right to speedy trial was asserted in this case back in 2022. However, the remaining Barker factors outweigh the presumption of prejudice. The Court here notes that the reason for delay here was that the victim witness was serving abroad in the United States Military, thus the delay was not attributable to the People. The final cognizable factor requires consideration whether defendant suffered undue prejudice due to a speedy trial rights violations. Considering the three applicable factors the right to speedy trial is intended to protect, the Court concludes here that the defendant failed to demonstrate additional particularized prejudice but instead relies in conclusory arguments that are insufficient and underdeveloped, such that his claim of prejudice is waived pursuant to Rule 22(m). Accordingly the Superior Court’s order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial is affirmed.

Mon, 13 Apr 2026 17:08:00 GMT

In an appeal from an order granting enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement, the judgment is reversed. In a tort claim, court-ordered mediation took place in 2024. After seven hours of discussion, the terms of a settlement agreement were read in writing and confirmed in an email. Neither the mediator nor counsel for any of the parties filed a notice with the Superior Court that an agreement had been reached. The Superior Court determined that the elements of an enforceable contract—“offer, acceptance of that offer, and consideration”—were satisfied based on the emails between the parties’ counsels and the mediator, and that Attorney Sheesley possessed the authority to bind the plaintiffs to the terms of that contract since he acted with actual or apparent authority as their agent. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reverses, noting that “[a] substantive rule of law . . . creates and defines the rights, duties, and obligations that are subsequently administered by procedural rules of law,” whereas “[a] procedural rule regulates the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The instant case raises a novel issue: what law prevails if a conflict arises between a procedural court rule adopted by this Court through the rule-making process and a substantive common law doctrine created by this Court through ordinary adjudication? Here, it is readily apparent from the plain text of Civil Rule 90 that this Court did not intend to displace the common law of contracts. In fact, there is no conflict between the rule and the common law at all Civil Rule 90, by its own clear and unambiguous language, applies only to court-ordered mediation in civil cases pending in the Superior Court. It does not purport to govern all agreements, or even all agreements arising from mediation. But even more importantly, Civil Rule 90 does not purport to change the common-law requirements for entering into a valid contract. Civil Rule 90 is clear: if the parties enter into a written agreement signed by the parties and their counsel and notify the Superior Court in accordance with Civil Rule 90(h)(2), then the Superior Court may exercise authority to enforce that agreement as part of the same civil action if a party breaches it or fails to perform. In this appeal it is concluded that the Superior Court erred in disregarding Civil Rule 90 and analyzing the defendants’ motion only through the lens of the common law of contracts. At this stage, the question is not one of whether the parties entered into an enforceable contract or agreement, but whether the Superior Court possessed the authority to enforce such an agreement as part of the existing civil case without any of the parties seeking and receiving leave to amend their pleadings to assert a claim or defense based on such agreement. While the common law of contracts may inform whether the parties entered into an agreement, the Superior Court lacks enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3) unless the agreement also satisfies the additional formalities required by Civil Rule 90(h)(2). The agreement—if any—reached at the mediation does not satisfy the requirements of Civil Rule 90(h)(2), and the Superior Court consequently lacked authority to enforce it under Civil Rule 90(h)(3). This does not constitute a holding by this Court that the parties did not enter into an enforceable settlement agreement at the mediation; it only means that the defendants cannot enforce such an agreement as part of the underlying civil action and without amending their pleadings, but must instead do so by initiating a new case in the Superior Court—and even then, they may prove their case only through
respecting the privileges codified in Civil Rules 90(d)(8)-(9). Accordingly, the March 4, 2025 dismissal order is vacated and the plaintiffs’ complaint and defendants’ counterclaims are reinstated. While sanctions pursuant to Civil Rule 90(h)(3) are not warranted because the parties’ failure to comply with Civil Rule 90(h)(2) precludes the Superior Court from exercising its enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3), it appears that Vasaturo’s conduct might warrant mandatory, non-discretionary sanctions under Civil Rule 90(f)(2). Therefore, in addition to ordering the reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims, we direct the Superior Court on remand to determine whether to assess against Vasaturo the mandatory sanctions called for in Civil Rule 90(f)(2).

Wed, 25 Mar 2026 12:31:00 GMT

In an appeal of a motion by the respondent to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
a threshold matter, section 166i—which establishes “non-waivable jurisdictional conditions that must be satisfied in order to vest the Superior Court with subject matter jurisdiction to hear an individual's medical malpractice claims” under the VIMMA, does not set a deadline for a claimant to satisfy the statutory pre-filing conditions. It is undisputed by the parties that Appellant filed a proposed complaint with the Committee on January 28, 2019,’ satisfying the first condition under section 166i. It is likewise undisputed that after the Committee failed to respond within 90 days, Appellant filed her complaint in the Superior Court on April 29, 2019, thereby satisfying the second condition. At that point the Superior Court’s jurisdiction was properly vested. Thus the parties and the Superior Court mistakenly characterized the statute of limitations issue as a jurisdictional challenge, and it was error to grant the defense motion to dismiss this matter on that basis. On the statute of limitation issues, the Superior Court abused its discretion in failing to address the plailntiff’s statutory tolling argument, which should have been considered independtntly from the fraudulent concealment doctrine. It also erred in ruling that the statute of limitations was not tolled under the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine, relying on representations of counsel rather than the complaint’s allegations – and considering matters outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s June 9, 2023 Order dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the ruling that the VIMMA’s two-year statute of limitations was not tolled are reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings to allow the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent materials as required under Rule 12(d) and for the Superior Court to first address the VIMMA’s statutory tolling provision under section 1 66d(a), and, if necessary, the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine.