Published Opinions News Summary

Wed, 25 Mar 2026 12:32:00 GMT

In an appeal from an order granting enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement, the judgment is reversed. In a tort claim, court-ordered mediation took place in 2024. After seven hours of discussion, the terms of a settlement agreement were read in writing and confirmed in an email. Neither the mediator nor counsel for any of the parties filed a notice with the Superior Court that an agreement had been reached. The Superior Court determined that the elements of an enforceable contract—“offer, acceptance of that offer, and consideration”—were satisfied based on the emails between the parties’ counsels and the mediator, and that Attorney Sheesley possessed the authority to bind the plaintiffs to the terms of that contract since he acted with actual or apparent authority as their agent. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reverses, noting that “[a] substantive rule of law . . . creates and defines the rights, duties, and obligations that are subsequently administered by procedural rules of law,” whereas “[a] procedural rule regulates the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The instant case raises a novel issue: what law prevails if a conflict arises between a procedural court rule adopted by this Court through the rule-making process and a substantive common law doctrine created by this Court through ordinary adjudication? Here, it is readily apparent from the plain text of Civil Rule 90 that this Court did not intend to displace the common law of contracts. In fact, there is no conflict between the rule and the common law at all Civil Rule 90, by its own clear and unambiguous language, applies only to court-ordered mediation in civil cases pending in the Superior Court. It does not purport to govern all agreements, or even all agreements arising from mediation. But even more importantly, Civil Rule 90 does not purport to change the common-law requirements for entering into a valid contract. Civil Rule 90 is clear: if the parties enter into a written agreement signed by the parties and their counsel and notify the Superior Court in accordance with Civil Rule 90(h)(2), then the Superior Court may exercise authority to enforce that agreement as part of the same civil action if a party breaches it or fails to perform. In this appeal it is concluded that the Superior Court erred in disregarding Civil Rule 90 and analyzing the defendants’ motion only through the lens of the common law of contracts. At this stage, the question is not one of whether the parties entered into an enforceable contract or agreement, but whether the Superior Court possessed the authority to enforce such an agreement as part of the existing civil case without any of the parties seeking and receiving leave to amend their pleadings to assert a claim or defense based on such agreement. While the common law of contracts may inform whether the parties entered into an agreement, the Superior Court lacks enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3) unless the agreement also satisfies the additional formalities required by Civil Rule 90(h)(2). The agreement—if any—reached at the mediation does not satisfy the requirements of Civil Rule 90(h)(2), and the Superior Court consequently lacked authority to enforce it under Civil Rule 90(h)(3). This does not constitute a holding by this Court that the parties did not enter into an enforceable settlement agreement at the mediation; it only means that the defendants cannot enforce such an agreement as part of the underlying civil action and without amending their pleadings, but must instead do so by initiating a new case in the Superior Court—and even then, they may prove their case only through
respecting the privileges codified in Civil Rules 90(d)(8)-(9). Accordingly, the March 4, 2025 dismissal order is vacated and the plaintiffs’ complaint and defendants’ counterclaims are reinstated. While sanctions pursuant to Civil Rule 90(h)(3) are not warranted because the parties’ failure to comply with Civil Rule 90(h)(2) precludes the Superior Court from exercising its enforcement authority under Civil Rule 90(h)(3), it appears that Vasaturo’s conduct might warrant mandatory, non-discretionary sanctions under Civil Rule 90(f)(2). Therefore, in addition to ordering the reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims, we direct the Superior Court on remand to determine whether to assess against Vasaturo the mandatory sanctions called for in Civil Rule 90(f)(2).

Wed, 25 Mar 2026 12:31:00 GMT

In an appeal of a motion by the respondent to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
a threshold matter, section 166i—which establishes “non-waivable jurisdictional conditions that must be satisfied in order to vest the Superior Court with subject matter jurisdiction to hear an individual's medical malpractice claims” under the VIMMA, does not set a deadline for a claimant to satisfy the statutory pre-filing conditions. It is undisputed by the parties that Appellant filed a proposed complaint with the Committee on January 28, 2019,’ satisfying the first condition under section 166i. It is likewise undisputed that after the Committee failed to respond within 90 days, Appellant filed her complaint in the Superior Court on April 29, 2019, thereby satisfying the second condition. At that point the Superior Court’s jurisdiction was properly vested. Thus the parties and the Superior Court mistakenly characterized the statute of limitations issue as a jurisdictional challenge, and it was error to grant the defense motion to dismiss this matter on that basis. On the statute of limitation issues, the Superior Court abused its discretion in failing to address the plailntiff’s statutory tolling argument, which should have been considered independtntly from the fraudulent concealment doctrine. It also erred in ruling that the statute of limitations was not tolled under the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine, relying on representations of counsel rather than the complaint’s allegations – and considering matters outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s June 9, 2023 Order dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the ruling that the VIMMA’s two-year statute of limitations was not tolled are reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings to allow the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent materials as required under Rule 12(d) and for the Superior Court to first address the VIMMA’s statutory tolling provision under section 1 66d(a), and, if necessary, the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine.

Tue, 10 Mar 2026 17:20:00 GMT

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage. According to the brief record, in 2017 the Bank of St. Croix sued Gabrielle Frongillo, John Frongillo, and 40 King Place, LLC (the “judgment debtors”1 ), to foreclose on Plot No. 40-A & B (5,466 square feet) of King Street, Town of Christiansted, St. Croix (“the Property”). The Bank obtained a default judgment. During post-judgment proceedings, approximately five years elapsed with little activity on the docket. 2 Then, on April 4, 2023, the Bank—as judgment creditor—obtained a writ of execution and attached the Property. The Property was to be auctioned in a marshal’s sale, and the Bank provided notice of the sale by publication. The sale was held on October 4, 2024, and the Property was sold to Kisha Christian. 3 ¶ 3 On November 20, 2024, the Bank moved for an order of confirmation of the sale. The Superior Court granted the motion and confirmed the sale about five months later on April 16, 2025. 4 The docket sheet contains no activity during this five-month interval, save for a notice of change of contact information for the Bank’s counsel.

Mon, 09 Mar 2026 16:57:00 GMT

Appellant appeals from the Superior Court’s order finding her in contempt of court, revoking her probation, and sentencing her to the remainder of her suspended sentence. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed. The defendant was denied due process because the Superior Court’s order failed to (1) identify the type of hearing being conducted, (2) specify the alleged violations that formed the basis for the hearing, and (3) afford sufficient time to prepare a defense. Due process in parole revocation proceedings requires: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.

In the Virgin Islands, the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.1 also sets out requirements for conducting a parole revocation hearing. In the case at bar, Moses was not provided with notice that apprised her of the hearing or that would have allowed her to adequately prepare for it. In addition to notice of the nature of the proceedings, an individual also has a due process right to notice of the charges against them. In the case at bar, the Superior Court failed either to state the facts constituting the alleged contempt and designate the contemptuous conduct as criminal—as would be required if the proceedings were for criminal contempt—or to specify which condition of probation Moses was alleged to have violated—if the proceedings were for revocation. In addition to failing to provide Moses with notice of the type of hearing that would be conducted and the charges she would face at that hearing, the Superior Court’s order did not give Moses sufficient time to prepare. As a result, the notice given to Moses was defective and deprived her of due process. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court holding her in contempt and revoking her probation is reversed, her sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to reinstate Moses’ probation

Thu, 29 Jan 2026 17:24:00 GMT

Considering an appeal from the Superior Court’s April 26, 2024 order denying a petition for a writ of coram nobis and an ensuing October 8 ,2024 order denying a motion for reconsideration thereof, although the petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands nevertheless resolves this case on the merits because the Government failed to challenge the timeliness of the appeal and the case involves a pure question of law that was fully briefed by the parties. With respect to the merits, the Superior Court erred in characterizing the March 15, 2010 oral sentence as the final judgment in the petitioner’s criminal case, and in concluding that her coram nobis petition was therefore procedurally barred under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), since the Superior Court’s judgment in the petitioner’s criminal case did not become final until April 8, 2010, subsequent to the issuance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) on March 31 of that same year. Thus, applying the rule announced in Padilla would not constitute a retroactive application thereof, and the petition is not procedurally barred. The Superior Court’s April 26, 2024 order is reversed, as is its October 8, 2024 order denying reconsideration thereof, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

Thu, 29 Jan 2026 12:57:00 GMT

In an appeal from a November 2024 order of the Superior Court dismissing the petitioner’s internal appeal from a July 2024 order of the Magistrate Division that dismissed the petitioner’s verified petition for probate of the estate of her sister, who died testate, the Superior Court erred in characterizing the internal appeal as unripe, since the Magistrate Division ordered the underlying probate case closed and—in any event—petitioner chose to stand by her petition largely as filed. Moreover, the Magistrate Division erred both in dismissing the probate petition for failure to prosecute without identifying or weighing the factors described in Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.I. 505 (V.I. 2010), and in directing the petitioner to supplement her petition with various documents unsupported by probate law. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s November 6, 2024 order dismissing petitioner’s internal appeal is reversed, the Magistrate Division’s July 30, 2024 dismissal order is vacated, and this case is remanded to the Magistrate Division to continue to oversee administration of the decedent’s estate pursuant to the petition.

Thu, 29 Jan 2026 12:56:00 GMT

Considering the plaintiffs’ appeal from the Superior Court’s December 4, 2023 opinion and order dismissing their claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and designating that dismissal as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, the designation is reversed because the Superior Court made no express findings to support its determination that there was no just reason for delay within the intendment of the rule, and this Court is not required to independently scour the record to determine whether the Superior Court could have properly certified its opinion and order despite its failure to conduct any meaningful analysis under Civil Rule 54(b). Nevertheless, the Superior Court’s order qualifies for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine because the three factors from In re Holcombe, 63 V.I. 800 (V.I. 2015) are satisfied, thus permitting the instant appeal to proceed. With respect to the merits, the Superior Court correctly determined that several affiliated corporate entities consented to personal jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands, but erred by failing to also impute that consent to another affiliated corporate entity. Accordingly, the portion of the December 4, 2023 opinion and order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on personal jurisdiction grounds is reversed.

Thu, 04 Dec 2025 13:11:00 GMT

In this appeal from an order of the Superior Court holding appellant in contempt for obstructing the parenting time of the appellee with their minor child, and ordered her to reimburse him for travel and all other reasonable expenses he incurred for the parties’ minor child’s trip to Italy, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Acivil contempt order is final for purposes of an appeal when the court adjudicating the issues makes a finding of contempt and imposes an appropriate sanction, but an order typically needs to be quantified to be considered final: an order is not final until the award granted by the court is reduced to a determinate or quantified amount, and here the the Superior Court did not quantify in the order the specific amount in reimbursement awarded to appellee for travel expenses, airfare, prorated housing cost, meal, and other reasonable expenses incurred for the minor child’s trip to Italy. The quantification requirement avoids a piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation, which would thwart the important policy underlying the final judgment rule. Because the Superior Court’s August 1, 2023 order contained an award that was not quantified, or because the order failed to state the amount of the award to be paid, it was not a final order, and we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Therefore, this case is remanded to the Superior Court for further determination consistent with this opinion.