2015 Published Opinions News Summary

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:26:00 GMT

Convictions for first-degree robbery and unauthorized possession of a firearm during a crime of violence are affirmed. An argument need only be fairly presented to the Superior Court in order to be presented for review on appeal, as stated in V.I.S.CT.R. 4(h), and under this standard moving for a judgment of acquittal once—whether after the People rest, after the close of evidence, or after the jury returns a verdict—is sufficient to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. However, there is no merit to the challenge in this case since a single positive eyewitness identification may be sufficient proof of guilt, and the defendant's remaining sufficiency arguments go to the credibility of the witnesses, which will not be reviewed on appeal. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for robbery in the first degree under 14 V.I.C. § 1861 and § 1862(2) given the testimony of witnesses that the defendant demanded and received money from the victim at gunpoint. Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm during a crime of violence under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), which contains no requirement that the People produce a firearm in court, or show that it was operable; all that is required is evidence that the defendant had an unlicensed firearm in his possession during a crime of violence. In this case three witnesses testified to seeing the defendant carry a gun during the robbery, and he stipulated that he did not have a license to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands. Defendant has made no showing that the Superior Court's failure to grant a new trial in the interests of justice under Superior Court Rule 135 was an abuse of its discretion. His challenge to the out-of-court identification during police investigations using an array of photographs is waived under V.I.S.CT.R. 22(m) for failure to cite even a single supporting legal authority, and he has not explained either on this appeal or before the Superior Court how the photo-array used in this case was impermissibly suggestive. The Superior Court's denial of the suppression motion is affirmed, and the September 26, 2013 judgment and commitment for these offenses is affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:24:00 GMT

The December 24, 2014 decision of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, granting a writ of mandamus directing the St. Croix District Board of Elections, its members, and the Government of the Virgin Islands, to cease immediately a recount of votes cast for Alicia “Chucky” Hansen in the 2014 general election in the District of St. Croix for the office of senator is affirmed. Although the Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it disregarded a notice of removal of these proceedings to the federal court, that error was harmless because the United States District Court remanded the matter and acknowledged that proceedings in the Superior Court were ongoing. The Superior Court erred in holding that Hansen lacked standing as a “candidate” to petition the Board of Elections for a recount. It also erred in implicitly rejecting the claim that elections officials unilaterally commenced a recount without first obtaining authorization from a majority of the Board of Elections by vote granting the petition for a recount, which the Board's official records all indicated had not been done. The recount was initiated with no legal authority, and thus the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus. The Superior Court also erred in concluding that the Board could waive statutory timeliness requirements governing recount petitions as set forth in 18 V.I.C. § 629. For the reasons set forth in detail in the present Opinion, the reasoning of the Superior Court's December 24, 2014 opinion was in error but its ultimate decision to grant the writ of mandamus directing that the recount be ceased was correct and that result is affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:23:00 GMT

In litigation concerning a former employee's claims of unlawful discrimination in employment brought pursuant to the federal Civil Rights Act, several Virgin Islands statutes, and Virgin Islands common law, the Superior Court erred when it dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds when the employer had waived its statute of limitations defense by failing to plead it in its answer. In addition, the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act and the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act establish liabilities independent of the common law and are governed by the six-year limitations period of 5 V.I.C. § 31(3)(B), and not the two-year period prescribed in § 31(5)(A). Construing and applying 24 V.I.C. § 76, the employee sufficiently pled a cause of action under the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act based on a demotion from his former position. In addition, construing and applying 10 V.I.C. § 3, the employee also pled a valid claim for violation of the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act based on the employer's conduct, and the Legislature authorized a private cause of action for violations of 24 V.I.C. § 451 which can be premised on such conduct. The Superior Court's April 5, 2014 opinion and order granting the employer's motion to dismiss is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:21:00 GMT

In a child custody dispute, the Superior Court failed to follow the required procedure and failed to properly consider the best interests of the child in setting the terms of custody and visitation in its order. Although custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, such review is impossible where the Superior Court fails to explain its reasoning. Here, the Superior Court failed to comply with the two-step procedure required in custody determinations, requiring the court to (1) outline a set of relevant factors that it will use to determine the best interests of the child, and (2) explain how its findings of fact regarding those factors are supported by the evidence introduced at the hearing. The order also failed to set out a permanent and unambiguous scheme governing custody until the child's eighteenth birthday. Therefore, the Superior Court's June 14, 2014 custody order is vacated and the case is remanded for the court to set out a permanent custody arrangement after following the required procedure and affording the parties an opportunity to examine the guardian ad litem under oath in accordance with their procedural due process rights.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:19:00 GMT

Considering an initial appeal taken from a Superior Court order denying a motion to nullify various resolutions passed by the board of directors of a corporation and denying a request to appoint a receiver for such corporation and a subsequent order denying a motion for reconsideration of this decision, and a second appeal taken from an order adopting a plan, created by the Superior Court, to wind up the affairs of a partnership between the litigants, as well as a cross-appeal filed therein, all of which were consolidated by order dated February 20, 2015, are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Section 33(b)(2) of title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code, construed in a manner consistent with the federal statute it is modelled after, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)-(2), authorizes appellate jurisdiction in three discrete situations: the appointment of a receiver, the refusal to wind up a receivership, and the refusal to take steps to accomplish the purposes of a receivership. Here, appellant does not challenge the Superior Court's decision to appoint a liquidating partner and to establish a wind up plan for the partnership, and the Superior Court's plan cannot be characterized as a refusal to take steps to accomplish the purposes of winding up the partnership. Rather, appellant only challenges various matters that fall within the administration of winding up the partnership, over which the Superior Court possesses considerable discretion and which are not immediately appealable. In addition, the Superior Court's orders governing how the partnership is wound up cannot be appealable as injunctions under 4 V.I.C. § 33(b)(1) because treating such directives as injunctions would render 4 V.I.C. § 33(b)(2) completely redundant and "superfluous," and would undermine the Legislature's desire to treat orders relevant to receiver ships differently than orders relevant to injunctions. Accordingly, appellee's motion to dismiss the consolidated appeal is granted, and the consolidated appeal and cross-appeal are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without considering the merits of any of the arguments the litigants have raised.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:18:00 GMT

In proceedings on remand pursuant to this Court's decision in In re Estate of Small, 57 V.I. 416 (V.I. 2012), the Appellate Division erred in affirming a magistrate's award of attorney's fees and costs relating to the prior appeal because the civil action that formed the basis of the probate dispute was a personal injury case, for which attorney's fees are prohibited. Because costs in probate proceedings may not exceed those allowed in the trial of a civil action under 15 V.I.C. § 165, and an award of attorney's fees for a non-frivolous personal injury claim is prohibited in the trial of a civil action by 5 V.I.C. § 541(b), such an award is likewise prohibited in probate proceedings and on appeal from probate proceedings by operation of Supreme Court Rule 30. Accordingly, the Appellate Division erred when it affirmed the magistrate's award of attorney's fees to the estate. While the attorney's fees award was thus prohibited by the statutes and Rule, the same is not true for costs awards and, although the appellants do not challenge the reasonableness of the costs awarded in this case, in order to be valid such awards must be "reasonable" as provided in V.I.S.CT.R. 30(a). The magistrate had the authority to consider the appellants' ability to pay when devising a reasonable award of costs in light of 15 V.I.C. § 162 and the Appellate Division erred when it failed to remand the matter to the magistrate to exercise discretion in considering appellants' ability to pay. The October 4, 2013 opinion and order affirming the magistrate's award of attorney's fees and other costs to the estate is reversed, and that portion awarding other costs is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:16:00 GMT

In an appeal from a Superior Court opinion and order denying a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, the judgment is affirmed. In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the Superior Court must consider whether: (1) the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy and may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The Superior Court's order and opinion on the plaintiff's complaint relating to protest of a bid award on a public contract, after two days of hearings, was unduly deferential to the Housing Authority's explanation for why it did not award the contract to plaintiff, but that error was harmless. As a matter of law, the Authority could not have awarded the contract to plaintiff when it did not have a license necessary to perform that contract. Consequently, plaintiff has an extremely low likelihood of ultimately succeeding on the merits, since it did not possess a license that was required to qualify it to perform the demolition work contemplated by the contract. No error is found in the Superior Court's assessment of the remaining factors, including the finding that harm to the Housing Authority and the public interest from loss of federal grant funds would greatly outweigh any irreparable harm plaintiff might suffer in the unlikely prevent it prevails. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the January 23, 2015 opinion and order are affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 18:15:00 GMT

An order of the Superior Court denying relief on a complaint for mandamus relief as well as injunctive relief is reversed. In reviewing plaintiff's claim that the Government failed to comply with the requirements of Act No. 4844 to instruct students in the history of the Virgin Islands and basic Caribbean history, the court did not grant a hearing as requested but instead erred by crediting inadmissible, unsworn factual assertions made by the Government in its opposition. The error may be harmless as applied to the mandamus claim because - to warrant such relief - a petitioner must establish that there is no other adequate means to attain the desired relief and that its right to the writ is clear and indisputable. In this case the plaintiff has other avenues available to her to compel the Government to comply with Act No. 4844, such as her alternate claim under 5 V.I.C. § 80, a statute authorizing taxpayer actions to restrain illegal or unauthorized acts by a territorial officer or employee, or the wrongful disbursement of territorial funds. However, the Superior Court analyzed the merits of the complaint solely through the lens of her mandamus claim and did not address the statutory cause of action. The implicit denial of a claim, without providing any reasons, constitutes reversible error. The June 26, 2014 order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court so that it may consider the claim under 5 V.I.C. § 80 on the merits, and to reconsider the denial of mandamus relief in the event it were to conclude that relief is not available to that statute.