https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19297172 Considering the People’s motion seeking to vacate the Superior Court’s orders granting the defendant’s motion to suppress tangible and derivative evidence obtained from a search of a residence that he shared with his wife, shortly after he had physically assaulted her with a closed fist and a handgun while he had been intoxicated earlier that evening, the Superior Court was correct in finding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against improper search and seizure was not violated in that search, as his wife possessed common authority over the premises and had consented to the search. However, the Superior Court abused its discretion in suppressing the handgun and ammunition recovered in that search and committed clear error in dismissing the criminal counts against the defendant related thereto. Not only was the Superior Court incorrect in finding that the defendant had been subject to custodial interrogation in the residence when he made statements to police regarding the handgun, but the Superior Court also erroneously suppressed physical evidence as a remedy for the supposed violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, when in fact such remedy only includes physical evidence if a defendant’s statements are made involuntarily. Here, the defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and were not made under custodial interrogation; therefore no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination was committed. Accordingly, no suppression of either physical or testimonial evidence was warranted. Consequently, the Superior Court’s orders granting the defendant’s motion to suppress are reversed and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further action. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20741866 12810860_20741866 Thu, 13 Mar 2025 14:46:00 GMT An order of the Superior Court denying a post-judgment motion contesting the Virgin Islands Marshal’s execution on a truck is reversed. Because the Marshal’s seizure of the truck exceeded the terms of the July 15, 2019 judgment, and the writ did not authorize its seizure, the execution was invalid under 5 V.I. Code § 473(1). Consequently, the Superior Court erred by denying the pending motion requesting the release of this truck. Denial of the motion is reversed and this case is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter an order requiring the Marshal to release the truck. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19998648 12810860_19998648 Wed, 03 Jan 2024 13:09:00 GMT In this matter the Court granted the petition of the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority for permission to appeal to answer the question certified by the Superior Court: whether the explicit statutory duty imposed on WAPA extended as a duty personal to plaintiff’s decedent, Crescentus Oscar (Oscar), on whose behalf this action may be brought alleging WAPA’s breach of that duty to him. However, because WAPA has waived its right to argue the issue by failing to address the certified question, instead electing to address two issues that were not certified – and in fact were never even considered by the Superior Court on the merits – it is concluded that that the petition for permission to appeal was improvidently granted, and the petition is therefore dismissed as forfeited. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19987111 12810860_19987111 Wed, 20 Dec 2023 15:30:00 GMT Although the Superior Court has not entered a final judgment in the underlying criminal case, since the charges remain pending, an order denying a motion for modification of bail, or granting bail modifications pursuant to conditions that the defendant cannot satisfy, qualifies for immediate appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, when it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. In an order of November 29, 2022, nominally granting, but in effect denying, the defendant’s motion for modification of bail, the Superior Court erred when it relied on the allegations made by the defendant’s former court-appointed attorneys in their motions to withdraw as counsel – considering these materials sua sponte without providing the defendant with a right to be heard. On remand, the defendant must be provided with an opportunity to be heard with respect to the matters raised by the Superior Court sua sponte. The appeal from a separate disposition of a motion to transfer the defendant from a detention facility on St. Thomas to a detention facility in St. Croix is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. No independent jurisdictional basis for an appeal from the transfer order exists under 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(4), and it is not reviewable under collateral order principles because it is not inextricably intertwined with the reviewable bail order, and does not satisfy other requirements for collateral order review. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19985283 12810860_19985283 Tue, 19 Dec 2023 19:59:00 GMT In an appeal by the appellant former husband from the Superior Court’s August 23, 2022 order, the parties’ assumption that this was is an interlocutory order providing for pendente lite support under § 108 is mistaken. Despite labeling it a “Pendente Lite Order,” the Superior Court’s order was not an interlocutory pendente lite support order issued pursuant to § 108, but rather a final order of alimony issued pursuant to § 109. The Superior Court lacked authority to award pendente lite support under § 108, given that it had already entered a judgment in the divorce action which dissolved the parties’ marriage and, by extension, terminated the husband’s obligation to support the wife pursuant to § 342. Superior Court lacked the authority to award alimony after the divorce had already been granted; the former wife was required to assert a claim for alimony in her answer or other pleading and should not have been permitted to make such a claim in a motion filed almost one month after entry of the divorce decree. An interpretation of 16 V.I.C. § 110 to permit the Superior Court to modify a divorce decree to provide for alimony, even if alimony had never been sought, has been rejected by the only Virgin Islands court to have considered the question, and the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have construed similar statutes to hold that divorce decrees may be modified to include alimony or other types of spousal support at a later date only if the decree includes an express provision retaining jurisdiction to permit a future application for spousal support. A divorce decree—even one that does not resolve every outstanding issue between the parties—is not an interlocutory order, but a final order, see 16 V.I.C. § 109, and thus is not subject to plenary modification, but like other final judgments may only be altered in certain specifically enumerated circumstances. And while the February 14, 2022 divorce decree expressly retained jurisdiction to determine an appropriate distribution of the parties’ marital assets, it did not retain or reserve jurisdiction to award alimony or any other support payments at some future date. Consequently, the Superior Court lacked authority to order the former husband to make any support, maintenance, or attorney’s fees payments, and the portion of the August 23, 2022 order requiring the former husband to pay the former wife cash per month, provide her with $5,000 credit card access per month, and to pay a one-time sum of $350,000 for legal expenses, is reversed. On remand, the Superior Court is directed promptly to resolve the last remaining issue before it—the distribution of marital assets. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19858842 12810860_19858842 Tue, 24 Oct 2023 20:26:00 GMT The governmental defendants’ interlocutory appeal of an order by the Superior Court denying their motion for conduct of a bench trial in the disposition of this matter is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. In an action alleging medical malpractice under the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act and the Virgin Islands Medical Malpractice Act, defendants filed a motion for a bench trial, arguing that Sections 3408 and 3413 of the Tort Claims Act – which require that trials of actions instituted under the Tort Claims Act be “by the Court sitting without a jury” – are jurisdictional prerequisites to the voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity by the Government of the Virgin Islands. The Superior Court ruled that the Medical Malpractice Act superseded the Tort Claims Act, and orally denied the government defendants’ motion from the bench on March 11, 2020. The governmental appealed and clarified that the appeal was filed pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. On plaintiff’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, it is held that the Superior Court’s order is not an immediately appealable collateral order because the question of whether the Government is entitled to a bench trial instead of a jury trial based on the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act is effectively reviewable after the Superior Court enters a final order. Therefore this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19815238 12810860_19815238 Thu, 21 Sep 2023 18:42:00 GMT In considering the petitioner’s appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Superior Court erred when it held that he failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel’s complete failure to respond to the People’s motion or to otherwise take action after the Superior Court increased petitioner’s sentence nine months after issuance of the December 2, 2012 judgment and commitment was outside of the wide range of reasonable professional judgment and competent assistance, and the result of the proceeding would certainly have been different if petitioner had the actual assistance of a minimally competent attorney. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s November 13, 2020 order denying the petition is reversed. On remand, the Superior Court is directed to grant the habeas corpus petition and immediately provide post-conviction relief in the form of vacating the August 28, 2013 order and amended judgment and commitment, and reinstating the original December 2, 2012 judgment and commitment. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19786551 12810860_19786551 Fri, 08 Sep 2023 20:31:00 GMT In a proceeding contesting ownership and use of real property, the Superior Court has entered an order enforcing a mediated settlement agreement reached between the appellant and his two brothers, but did not make any oral or written findings of fact or conclusions of law, and did not make a single reference to the record, nor to any of the parties’ arguments, or the law that it applied in deciding to enforce the mediated settlement agreement. Therefore, the December 5, 2022 order is vacated and this case is remanded so that the Superior Court can enter a new order either enforcing or refusing to enforce the mediated settlement agreement based on a recitation of factual findings and conclusions of law sufficient to enable meaningful appellate review. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19617443 12810860_19617443 Fri, 16 Jun 2023 20:41:00 GMT