2017 Published Opinions News Summary

Wed, 04 Jun 2025 20:13:00 GMT

In an appeal from a defendant’s convictions of first degree unlawful sexual contact in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1708(a)(1) and first degree rape in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1701(a)(2), because the defendant’s convictions arise from the same act or course of conduct, the defendant’s conviction for first degree unlawful sexual contact is vacated the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing in accordance with the decision in Titre v. People, 70 V.I. 797 (V.I. 2019). Additionally, because 14 V.I.C. § 1701 unreasonably and arbitrarily subjects the defendant to punishment for his conduct, while allowing others who engage in the same conduct prohibited by that statute to escape punishment merely because they are married to their victims, the statute is unconstitutionally underinclusive in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. However, the appropriate remedy in this circumstance is to sever and strike the marital exemption provided in 14 V.I.C. §1701(c) from the remainder of the statute. Because the remaining portions of that statute are upheld as being constitutionally valid, the defendant’s conviction for first degree rape in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1701(a)(2) is affirmed.

Fri, 23 Jun 2023 12:52:00 GMT

Court-appointed counsel for appellant is found in civil contempt for his failure to comply with numerous orders of this Court. This attorney failed to timely comply with five clear and unambiguous orders of the court, on such issues as filing of a completed Transcript Purchase Order and briefing requirements. After multiple show-cause orders, it is now determined that the attorney did not diligently attempt to comply with those orders in a reasonable manner. The attorney is directed to pay $1,000 to the Clerk of the Court, made payable to the Government of the Virgin Islands, no later than 14 days from the date of entry of this decision. Furthermore, the Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this opinion, together with all pertinent orders and filings, to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel so that it may consider whether disciplinary proceedings should be initiated pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 207.

Wed, 21 Apr 2021 20:42:00 GMT

In an appeal from a conviction for embezzlement in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1089, the argument that appeals taken to the Appellate Division on or after October 29, 2004 were heard without jurisdiction, and that opinions and orders in those appeals are void, would produce absurd results and is rejected under prior case law holdings. Because this appeal was taken before this Court assumed jurisdiction over appeals, the Appellate Division had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Revised Organic Act. Even if the defendant was not an officer, she was a servant of an officer under the statute, and a rational trier of fact could have found this essential element of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt based on the testimony and evidence introduced at trial. In the Virgin Islands embezzlement is defined as fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been entrusted, as provided in 14 V.I.C. § 1087. In the present case, the defendant’s taking was unlawful, as she did not have permission to obtain the cash advance funds and she instead procured them by subterfuge, and no reasonable juror could conclude that she had lawful custody or control of these funds by virtue of her trust within the meaning of the statute. The People failed to demonstrate that the defendant had specific authority or control over the cash advance funds sufficient to establish control by virtue of her trust, and her conviction for embezzlement under 14 V.I.C. § 1089 must therefore be reversed. This case is remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on the charge of embezzlement under 14 V.I.C. § 1089.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 02:02:00 GMT

Considering an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining a candidate from taking the oath of office as a member of the Legislature, no error is found. The Superior Court correctly held that the affirmative defense of laches did not bar a challenge to the candidate's qualifications to serve, since the equitable defense of laches does not apply to an action challenge the qualifications of an individual to hold office. The Superior Court erred in applying a taxpayer residency test to determine whether the candidate was a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands for the past three-years, since for purposes of section 6(b) of the Revised Organic Act, bona fide resident is synonymous with domicile. The error is harmless, however, in that domicile is determined by considering physical presence and intent, and the Superior Court made factual findings with respect to those factors. The Superior Court did not err when it concluded that the challengers to the candidate's qualifications were likely to succeed in establishing that the candidate was not a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands, since the Superior Court's factual findings in this regard were not clearly erroneous. The Superior Court's grant of a preliminary injunction is affirmed.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 02:01:00 GMT

Considering an appeal from the denial of a permanent injunction enjoining a candidate from taking the oath of office as a member of the Legislature, the Superior Court erred by failing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions in one or more proceedings. The doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position on a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact that is inconsistent with a position taken by that party in a previous judicial proceeding if the totality of the circumstances compels such a result. In conducting this inquiry, a court must focus on the impact that allowing the claims would have on the judicial process. The Superior Court erred when it declined to apply judicial estoppel to preclude the candidate from contradicting his claims of Tennessee residency and citizenship made in a prior bankruptcy proceeding, since those representations were clearly and unquestionably inconsistent with the candidate claiming to have been a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands. Because the inconsistent representations were without legitimate excuse or explanation, were made in a very short duration so as to warrant an inference that the candidate intended to play fast and loose with the court, were relied upon by the bankruptcy court, and involve the subjects of domicile and residency which affect many civic duties and should not be taken lightly, the balance of the equities supports application of judicial estoppel so as to preclude the candidate from claiming to have been a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands. The Superior Court's denial of a permanent injunction is vacated. Since the Superior Court failed to make findings on the remaining permanent injunction factors, and did not resolve other outstanding issues between the parties, the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Because it is possible that the Superior Court may not resolve all of these issues before the swearing-in of the 32nd Legislature, the Supreme Court issues a preliminary injunction pursuant to title 4, section 32(b) of the Virgin Islands Code enjoining the candidate from taking the oath of office until the completion of all proceedings on remand, as well as any associated appeal.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 01:59:00 GMT

remanded for a new trial. The Superior Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, may remove a juror and replace her with an alternate whenever facts are presented which convince the court that the juror's ability to perform her duty as a juror is impaired. Under 4 V.I.C. § 473(a) the court violates a defendant's right to a fair trial and commits error by removing an empaneled juror without good cause. In this case, the factual basis for removing the juror and seating an alternate during deliberations was not objectively verifiable or readily apparent, and the court committed error in removing the juror without conducting a hearing to demonstrate cause with findings on the record. This error prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights, with a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. The potential for serious harm and the interest of the defendant-and the public-in fair, unbiased, and secret deliberations are so great that no evidentiary showing of actual prejudice is required, and here it cannot be said that the defendant invited or induced the Superior Court's actions. Therefore, the convictions are vacated. As to issues likely to recur on remand, first, defendant's motion three days before trial to exclude evidence of drinking or distributing alcohol to minors was not untimely. While defendant was not charged with distributing alcohol to minors, the People solicited alcohol-related testimony from multiple witnesses, which was unfairly prejudicial, as it served no purpose other than to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. Secondly, given the expansive scope of the prohibition in Federal Rule of Evidence 412 on evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior, the Superior Court committed no error in prohibiting the defendant from presenting testimony that a victim was seen embracing another man. Nor did exclusion of this evidence deny his constitutional right to cross-examine the victim and otherwise put on a defense. The case is remanded for a new trial.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 01:58:00 GMT

In ruling on a petition for expungement of the applicant's arrest records the Superior Court erred when it treated the petition as one for discretionary expungement under 5 V.I.C. § 3733(b)(2) of the Virgin Islands Code. The record reflects that petitioner's assault case had been dismissed because he successfully completed a pretrial intervention program, and that his domestic violence case had been dismissed with prejudice. He also provided proof, in the form of a certified arrest record from the Virgin Islands Police Department, that he had no other pending arrests. Although at the time the petition for expungement was filed, § 3732 provided that certain expungements were discretionary rather than mandatory, the Legislature has decreed that the provisions of the expungement law apply retroactively, 5 V.I.C. § 3741, meaning that the petitioner should receive the benefit of the change to the law achieved on July 30, 2015-almost two months after the expungement petition was filed-when the Legislature enacted Act No. 7742. Thus, each of petitioner's convictions is subject to mandatory expungement pursuant to § 3732(1) and (3). Petitioner was therefore not required to make any showing of extraordinary circumstances to warrant expungement. Accordingly, the Superior Court's December 30, 2015 judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to grant the petition.

Fri, 15 Mar 2019 01:56:00 GMT

It was not error to deny reconsideration of the judgment in an action to determine ownership interests in certain property purchased at a tax auction nearly 15 years earlier. The Superior Court may set aside a final judgment when presented with newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). To prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence the aggrieved party must show that the evidence was in existence at the time of trial but for some excusable reason the evidence was not discovered by or otherwise made known to the party. In this case evidence allegedly discovered after the final judgment-a letter, a decision in another case, and records of property taxes paid by a third party-could all have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the trial. Therefore, the Superior Court correctly denied a motion to set aside its September 29, 2015 judgment. The judgment is affirmed.