https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18261995 In an appeal brought by the Government of the Virgin Islands on behalf of the Virgin Islands Department of Labor-Workers’ Compensation Administration (“VIDOL”), concerning the Superior Court’s November 2022 order denying its motion for leave to intervene as of right and compelling VIDOL to execute a general release in connection with its workers’ compensation lien against the appellee, directing the disbursement of the third party recovery to pay appellee’s attorney’s fees and costs ($6,037.33) first, with the remainder ($10,462.67) to VIDOL to settle its workers’ compensation lien, the Superior Court erred in denying the motion for leave to intervene as of right. However, the Superior Court did not err in directing the disbursement of the third party recovery to pay appellee’s legal fees first with the remainder to VIDOL to settle VIDOL’s workers’ compensation lien, and further did not err in compelling VIDOL to execute a general release in connection with its lien. However, the Superior Court’s order failed to account for $1,000 of the third party recovery. Thus, the Superior Court’s denial of the motion for leave to intervene as of right is reversed, and the portion of the Superior Court’s order directing VIDOL to execute a general release in connection with its lien is affirmed. However, those portions of the Superior Court’s order ordering the disbursement of the third party recovery are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court to allow the Government to intervene on behalf of VIDOL and to order the disbursement of $6,037.33 to pay for appellee’s legal fees first with the remainder of $11,462.67 to GVI to settle VIDOL’s lien. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20693687 12810860_20693687 Fri, 14 Feb 2025 15:45:00 GMT In an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and its motion for a new trial after a jury found the defendant regional airline liable to a former employee, the judgment is affirmed. The Superior Court committed no error when it denied the defendant’s renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence that, if credited by the jury, supported a finding that the defendant had terminated him due to his age. Plaintiff also introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate an entitlement to compensatory damages for mental anguish, and the record contains no indication that passion or prejudice on the part of the jurors contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s May 19, 2019 opinion and order are affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19150346 12810860_19150346 Mon, 05 Dec 2022 20:11:00 GMT In a matter before the Court pursuant to a notice filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, advising that the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands has issued an order suspending this attorney from the practice of law for two years, as well as responses filed by the attorney and the Board on Professional Responsibility, the Court declines to impose reciprocal discipline. While summary process has been adopted for imposing discipline on an attorney who has already been disciplined in another jurisdiction, see V.I.S.CT.R. 207.18, a lawyer facing identical discipline may rebut this presumption under one of the elements of V.I.S.CT.R. 207.18(d). When, as here, this Court concludes that reciprocal discipline may not be warranted, it simply means that the summary process shall not be invoked. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel must promptly conduct its own independent investigation of the ethical misconduct alleged in the January 25, 2022 order and the similar complaint filed with it and, if appropriate, prosecute a proceeding before the Board. The suspension order entered by the U.S. District Court did not provide the attorney the requisite notice or opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, reciprocal discipline will not be imposed. To the extent any discipline is warranted for the misconduct alleged by the District Court and similarly filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, it shall be imposed after an independent investigation and, if necessary, prosecution and adjudication pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 207. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19129424 12810860_19129424 Thu, 01 Dec 2022 17:46:00 GMT Plaintiff, a former employee, introduced evidence sufficient to sustain her causes of action for wrongful discharge against her former employer and two entities providing human resources management services to that employer, and sufficient to support awards of both compensatory and punitive damages against all of the defendants. However, plaintiff did not introduce sufficient evidence to sustain a defamation claim she had pled against the former employer. Further, the amount of punitive damages awarded against one of the human resources management defendants is unconstitutionally excessive in light of that defendant’s conduct in relation to that of the other defendants. The portion of the March 12, 2019 judgment holding the former employer liable for defamation is reversed, and the punitive damages award against one of the defendants is reduced from $750,000 to $360,000. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in all other respects. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18583324 12810860_18583324 Tue, 04 Oct 2022 18:04:00 GMT On a petition for mandamus naming the Office of the Lieutenant Governor’s Division of Banking, Insurance and Financial Regulation, and others, calling for investigation of three financial institutions – denied by the Superior Court and appealed to this Court – the appellant failed to submit sufficient argument or support to provide gounds upon which relief may be granted. While courts are typically lenient regarding pro se litigants, appellant’s one-paragraph brief simply asking for review of the same petition filed below lacks any legal analysis or support, and fails to comply with Rule 22 of the V.I. Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant has failed to show that he is entitled to relief by writ of mandamus, and has not exhausted the means available to him to obtain relief. The Superior Court did not err when it denied appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus: it fully considered the unsupported assertions he made, demonstrating careful consideration of his application. Upon review, appellant not only failed to state and support an adequate ground for relief, but also failed to meet the standards for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Appellant had multiple avenues for pursuing his sought-after relief, i.e., that his complaints be addressed, and from which relief could be obtained. The evidence and claims provided by the appellant show that remedies were suggested and provided by telephone, and encouraged in person. Absent a showing of an extraordinary circumstance for which he may be entitled to relief, appellant’s request is denied, and the Superior Court’s July 23, 2020 order is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18912713 12810860_18912713 Wed, 07 Sep 2022 18:24:00 GMT In a medical malpractice action arising from plaintiff’s treatment at the Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital, in which the plaintiff-patient entered into a mediated settlement agreement with the defendant doctor and the Government of the U.S. Virgin Islands, as his employer, on June 7, 2019, in which they agreed to pay plaintiff $170,000.00 in full settlement of all claims within 90 ninety days and to forgive her hospital bill in full in exchange for her release of all claims, the Superior Court erred when it declined to direct the defendants to pay interest at the 9% rate for the period from September 5, 2019 to the date they ultimately paid the $170,000 to the plaintiff, based on its mistaken belief that 5 V.I.C. § 426(b) precluded an interest award. In this case, § 426(b) is not applicable and plaintiff was therefore entitled, pursuant to § 951(a)(1) and (4), to interest at a rate of 9% per annum for the period between September 5, 2019, and the date the monies were ultimately paid to her. Under 11 V.I.C. § 951, interest awards are mandatory, and not within the discretion of a court. To hold that the Superior Court possesses the discretion to refuse to award interest at the 9% statutory rate on “all monies which have become due” or “money due or to become due where there is a contract and no rate is specified” would be tantamount to permitting the Superior Court to exercise discretion to not award damages that were proven by the prevailing party. Therefore, the Superior Court erred when it declined to order the defendants to pay such interest. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s February 19, 2021 order is reversed and the July 22, 2021 dismissal order is vacated as moot. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18910029 12810860_18910029 Tue, 06 Sep 2022 19:16:00 GMT In review of a document captioned “Verified Petition for Extraordinary Writ,” filed by four members of the Virgin Islands Bar, seeking to enjoin on numerous grounds enforcement of Supreme Court Rule 208 by the Virgin Islands Bar Association, the petition is treated as one brought pursuant to section 32(b), seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition. On these matters petitioners have failed to meet their burden, having failed to make any showing—let alone a clear and indisputable entitlement—that amended Rule 208 should be rescinded in whole or in part. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly held that integrated bar associations established by courts of last resort are fully immune from antitrust laws when acting pursuant to rules and directives promulgated by the court of last resort. However, this Court shares petitioners’ concern that the VIBA appears to have violated the express terms of Rule 208.7(D)(1), providing that a CLE compliance audit occur “[n]o earlier than one month and no later than six months following the reporting deadline,” by sending a notice of delinquency to one of the petitioners on July 8, 2022, when his reporting deadline was January 31, 2021. The VIBA is strictly limited to those powers plainly granted by this Court, which cannot be broadened by implication. It therefore lacks authority to simply disregard the plain text of Rule 208.7(D)(1)—or any court rule for that matter—by issuing notices of delinquency more than six months after the reporting deadline. If for any reason it cannot complete its audit within the provided time period, the appropriate action is to request an extension of time from this Court, as it has done in the past. The unilateral decision of the VIBA to conduct this late audit is exacerbated by its apparent decision to modify its website during the reporting period, as well as the incorrect information provided in the notice of delinquency sent to one of the petitioners, which erroneously advised him that he possessed 90 days to file an answer to the notice of delinquency even though Rule 208.7(D)(2)(c) provides that an answer must be filed within 30 days. Nevertheless, relief is denied for this claim as well. To obtain redress, it is not sufficient for the one petitioner who supplied supporting information simply to show that the VIBA acted contrary to the procedure set forth in Rule 208. Rather, he must also prove that he possesses no other adequate means to attain the desired relief. The record contains no indication that this petitioner paid any fines or fees to the VIBA based on the notice of delinquency or that the VIBA filed a notice of non-compliance with this Court requesting his suspension from the practice of law for non-compliance with Rule 208. Because allowing the internal process within the VIBA to run its natural course certainly represents an alternate adequate means for this petitioner to obtain the only relief to which he may be entitled—suspension of enforcement proceedings against him— he, like the other petitioners, has failed to meet his burden. Thus the petitioners failed to establish that their right to the requested relief is clear and indisputable, or that they lack any adequate alternate means to attain such relief, and accordingly the petition is denied. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18837874 12810860_18837874 Thu, 25 Aug 2022 18:46:00 GMT In an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of a petition to expunge a convicted felon’s criminal record, the gubernatorial pardon that the individual received fails to eradicate his criminal record; therefore, he does not fall within the provisions of the Virgin Islands expungement statute, which specifically states that the Superior Court may exercise its discretion to expunge a petitioner’s record provided the applicant was not convicted of a crime. As discussed in the present opinion, the Superior Court’s decision holding that this individual lacked the qualification to have his criminal record of convictions for second degree murder and possession of a dangerous weapon expunged pursuant to the Virgin Islands expungement statute, is affirmed. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18820149 12810860_18820149 Wed, 17 Aug 2022 21:02:00 GMT