https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=16516074 In an appeal from the Superior Court’s imposition of sanctions against an attorney in a personal injury case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the court’s denial of his motion to reconsider the court’s imposition of sanctions, both arising from the attorney’s certification in connection with a supplemental Rule 26 disclosure he filed indicating that a potential witness had discoverable information about the litigation, this attorney was afforded ample opportunity to address the issue of whether he made a reasonable inquiry concerning the extent of the potential witness’s knowledge before making that filing. Nevertheless, that filing caused plaintiff’s counsel to depose the potential witness, only to determine that the potential witness in fact had no such information, thus wasting the time of both the court and plaintiff’s counsel and resulting in an unnecessary delay of the proceedings and needless increase in the cost of the litigation. Even though the Superior Court cited Rule 11 as the basis for its sanctions ruling, the Superior Court, in fact, considered the correct reasonable inquiry requirement embodied in Rule 26 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, and it made the required finding that the attorney’s certification under Rule 26 was sanctionable pursuant to that standard. Its use of Rule 11 as the basis for its sanctions ruling, rather than Rule 26, was therefore harmless. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s imposition of sanctions against the attorney is affirmed, as well as its denial of the attorney’s motion to reconsider the imposition of sanctions. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20680439 12810860_20680439 Wed, 09 Apr 2025 15:39:00 GMT Regarding an appeal from the Superior Court’s orders denying plaintiff’s motion for a third extension of time to complete service and granting the individual defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, an evidentiary hearing is deemed to be necessary to determine whether the plaintiff’s motion should be granted by operation of Rule 4(n), either because, under all the circumstances, plaintiff has established the good cause required for a mandatory extension of the period within which to accomplish service of process or because the circumstances warrant a discretionary extension of such period, notwithstanding that they do not rise to the level of good cause required for a mandatory extension, as well as resolution of the matter of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has engaged in evasion of process, whether the defendant has waived his objection to proper service or has otherwise consented to jurisdiction, and whether the Superior Court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant under the Virgin Islands’ long-arm statute, 5 V.I.C. § 4903. Both orders are reversed and the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of service of process and personal jurisdiction. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=20669325 12810860_20669325 Wed, 29 Jan 2025 14:22:00 GMT Regarding the appellant’s motion requesting that a Designated Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Virgin Islands either withdraw his consent to appointment to that position or recuse himself from participating in the appeal, in which he further contends that the panel assigned to this appeal is illegally constituted on the ground that the Designated Justice purportedly lacks the statutory qualifications to serve in that capacity, it is noted, as a threshold matter, that the decision of a Justice to recuse or not recuse himself or herself from a case is a personal decision that is not reviewable by his or her colleagues. However, this same principle does not extend to claims that an appellate panel has been illegally constituted because one or more Justices fails to satisfy the constitutional or statutory requirements to serve. Addressing that question, the Court holds that a recently retired Judge of the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands who served on that court for fifteen years is qualified and authorized to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States Virgin Islands in the capacity of a Designated Justice pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 24(a), because that statute permits the designation of a retired judge of “a court of record in the Virgin Islands,” as opposed to “a court of record of the Virgin Islands,” and the District Court is unquestionably a court of record that is in the Virgin Islands. Appellant’s arguments that 4 V.I.C. § 24 is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers principles inherent in the Revised Organic Act are rejected. The motion is denied with respect to its claim that the panel in this appeal is not properly constituted. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18079333 12810860_18079333 Fri, 23 Jun 2023 12:39:00 GMT In an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial “in the interest of justice,” filed by a defendant convicted of first degree murder, affirmed on appeal by this Court, Rivera v. People, 64 V.I. 540, 545 (V.I. 2016), because the defendant is unable to meet the applicable burden as the movant in establishing each factor of the five-factor test supporting the granting of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the denial of the present motion was not an abuse of discretion, and the Superior Court’s denial of his post-trial motion for such relief is affirmed https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=19295929 12810860_19295929 Thu, 26 Jan 2023 16:52:00 GMT In deciding whether a defendant’s counterclaims were time-barred by the statute of limitations under then-applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) and 5 V.I.C. § 31, applicable Rule 3 provisions define commencement of the action, and it is evident that under Rule 13 there is an inherent connection between defendant’s compulsory counterclaims and plaintiff’s complaint. By definition, they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, and often involve the same evidence. Under the mandatory provisions of Civil Rule 13, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be asserted separately and will be lost if the defendant fails to plead it in response to plaintiff’s institution of a civil action. As a result, a compulsory counterclaim does not commence a separate civil action under 5 V.I.C. § 31 because it is reactive and can only be filed after the plaintiff has filed the underlying complaint. Therefore, the filing of plaintiff’s complaint stops the running of the statute of limitations on the defendant’s claims and compulsory counterclaims relate back to the date when plaintiff filed the complaint. Here, both the claim and counterclaim arose on the same date and at the same location and time, and it is likely that the same type of evidence and witnesses could shed light on these factual issues. Therefore, the defendant’s counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) and the Superior Court erred in dismissing it on statute of limitations grounds. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18447553 12810860_18447553 Tue, 29 Mar 2022 18:14:00 GMT In an appeal from orders granting summary judgment for the defendant in two negligence actions for lack of expert evidence to establish the issue of proximate causation of damage following a hurricane that hit a mobile home park on St. Croix where the plaintiffs leased space, the Superior Court did not err in holding that expert testimony was required in case No. 2020-0007, but erred in finding that expert testimony was required in case No. 2020-0008. Applying V.I. Rules of Evidence 701 and 702, expert testimony was required in the first case – which presented several technical issues related to the metallurgical properties of straps and anchors used to secure mobile homes to their pads, including standards in the mobile home trailer industry, the size, strength and metallurgic composition needed to withstand hurricane force winds, and whether the defendant’s unit on one lot in the park met those standards. In the second case, however, where there was testimony that the straps on the mobile home at issue were so rusted and rotted that they had completely broken off – and were no longer securing that home – a lay jury could clearly understand this kind of testimony without expert assistance. Thus, the metallurgical properties of the straps are not at issue in the second case. Therefore, summary judgment dismissing the first action for lack of proffered expert proof is affirmed, but summary judgment is reversed in the second case, which is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18080557 12810860_18080557 Mon, 18 Oct 2021 21:07:00 GMT Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and battery, domestic violence, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 298(3) and 16 V.I.C. § 91(b)(1)(2) in an amended plea agreement, pursuant to which the People submitted a recommended sentence of one year of incarceration with all but thirty days suspended. However, the Superior Court rejected that recommendation, ultimately sentencing the defendant to, inter alia, three years of incarceration. Defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the People breached the parties’ plea agreement when the prosecutor mentioned certain aggravating factors pertaining to him during allocution at the sentencing hearing, which in defendant’s view caused the judge to impose a harsher penalty than was recommended in the amended plea agreement. He likewise argues that the Superior Court violated Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure when, after accepting the plea agreement that was amended based on its instructions and concerns regarding the factual basis of the plea, it failed to adopt the recommended sentence, and instead imposed a harsher sentence. Following a review of the record, the Court concludes that the prosecutor’s statements during allocution do not constitute error, much less plain error. Nevertheless, the Court also concludes that the Superior Court judge violated the prohibition on judicial participation in plea agreement negotiations imposed by Rule 11, that this participation was in error, and that such error was plain. While Rule 11 clearly gives the Superior Court the authority to reject a plea agreement with which it does not fully agree, under that rule the Superior Court cannot participate in plea discussions so as to impose its view of what must be included in a plea agreement, absent the consent of the parties. Accordingly, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the Superior Court in order for it to conduct a plea agreement hearing consistent with Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure before a different Superior Court judge. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=18019910 12810860_18019910 Tue, 21 Sep 2021 15:17:00 GMT In an appeal from denial of a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure in an action on various legal theories against a lawfirm and its principal attorney, in which arbitration was terminated for failure to proceed with that process, the Superior Court erred when it determined that the Rule 60(b) motion had become moot, since the relief plaintiff requested in that motion was not precluded simply because the defense unilaterally initiated a second arbitration proceeding. Moreover, the plaintiff possessed a right to have his complaint reinstated as a matter of law due to the defense failure to initiate mediation prior to pursuing arbitration of their dispute and her breach of the arbitration agreements through her failure to participate in the initial arbitration. Therefore, the January 30, 2020, order denying the Rule 60(b) motion is reversed, the October 26, 2018 order of the Superior Court is vacated, and it is ordered that the plaintiff’s complaint be reinstated on remand. https://supreme.vicourts.org/cms/One.aspx?portalId=12810944&pageId=17999189 12810860_17999189 Fri, 10 Sep 2021 13:08:00 GMT